Israel’s recent invasion of Lebanon and subsequent bombing of much of the country is creating a new displacement crisis in the eastern Mediterranean. Of particular concern for the international community is the status of already-displaced Syrian refugees who fled to Lebanon early in the Syrian war and have largely tried to evade the government’s attempts to forcibly return them since. These refugees now face the multitude of risks associated with their home country — with the outcome of such massive displacement likely to worsen the push for forced returns to Syria on an international scale.
Indeed, world leaders are certainly monitoring the movement of roughly 1.2 million internally displaced in Lebanon. Around 405,000 people — some 70% are Syrians, according to estimates — returned to Syria in recent weeks. Some are watching out of concern for the well-being of those forcibly displaced due to fighting in Lebanon’s south and Israel’s relentless air campaign across the country, whereas some are sure to watch closely for any opportunity to return their Syrian refugee populations — particularly in Europe.
An increasing number of countries hosting Syrian refugees displaced by the fighting in their country since 2011 view the conflict as largely resolved, opting to assess certain areas of Syria as safe. This includes major regime-held governorates like Damascus and Latakia, where countries like Denmark have long advocated for returns, claiming the fighting has largely subsided there. Some states continue to take other measures, with Italy reinstating their ambassador to Syria, Lebanon forcing returns and complicating the living conditions for Syrian refugees pre-Israeli invasion, and Turkey forcing returns into newly developed communities across areas of its control in the north.
Extortion, Imprisonment, and Murder
Yet, as was the case before Lebanon’s new displacement crisis, Syria remains incredibly unsafe, even if the frontlines have quieted relative to their peak roughly five or six years ago.
The evidence is clear, regardless of politically-driven assessments from other states: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s security forces still arbitrarily detain, disappear, and torture anyone they deem a threat to the regime; Israel regularly bombs military and civilian infrastructure across the country; Iran-aligned militias and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) regularly fight in Syria’s northeast; and militias across the country continue to extort, imprison, and murder civilians to retain their power and profit off of the war.
This scenario is, by any understanding of international law, forced displacement to another war zone with no resources to take on the additional burden.
These are just some examples of the relative chaos that defines the failed state of Syria today. Indeed, the country remains fractured beyond recognition — a breakage that hardens by the year as Syrians increasingly struggle to view each other as one people. The state’s economy remains in freefall that even Assad’s closest allies argue is unacceptable given their investments in the country. Roughly 90% of the population lives below the poverty line, with youth joining militias to feed their families, smuggle drugs, weapons, and people, or flee the country due to a lack of real economic opportunity.
This is the Syria that hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Syrians are opting to flee to as bombs and bullets rain down on Lebanon. This scenario is, by any understanding of international law, forced displacement to another war zone with no resources to take on the additional burden.
Exploiting Double Displacement
Yet world leaders are very likely to use the movement of people to Syria as a case study for additional returns when the dust settles. Lebanon will be a crucial area to watch — will a country that could be facing a similar outcome to Gaza be able, let alone willing, to take in Syrian refugees who just fled? The Lebanese government used these same refugees as scapegoats mere weeks ago to shift blame from their widespread governance and corruption failures that have brought the country to its knees in recent years. As such, the odds of Beirut suddenly welcoming these individuals back seem incredibly low, especially if the war expands.
Other regional states are almost certain to follow suit in such a scenario. Turkey, which hosts roughly 3.2 million Syrian refugees, is already well ahead of the pack concerning forced returns to Syria. The massive wall along its shared border with Syria is designed to prevent more crossings, although smugglers regularly find ways to get people into the country. Given the widespread fears of the Assad regime and its handling of perceived enemies — a major sticking point for why most Syrians do not want to return — one can expect displaced Syrians to push towards Turkey on the way to Europe. In fact, this is already happening.
European states understand this dynamic, having experienced the migrant crisis of 2015 and 2016. While not nearly on par with that level of displacement, there are growing concerns in European capitals with the slow but increasing number of newly displaced arrivals in Europe. This is fueling a new far-right surge across the continent given ongoing and strong anti-refugee sentiments in places like The Netherlands, Italy, and Cyprus — the same surge that led many European states to re-engage Assad in recent months and years.
Growing Policy Contradictions
Ultimately, a new Israeli invasion of Lebanon was always going to create another displacement crisis given the roughly 1.5 million Syrians already displaced there, adding to the number of Palestinians in refugee camps and the broad economic suffering most Lebanese have been enduring for years.
Recognizing this, the United States and the European Union (EU) have worked to prioritize combatting any new displacement crisis. But US policy in the region since Oct. 7 has largely upended such efforts in a growing list of Middle East policy contradictions on the part of Washington over the last year.
A future US administration would be wise to consider the impacts of a broader displacement crisis stemming from a regional conflict in the Middle East. If its priorities are a stable Europe and Middle East, Washington should pursue a policy supporting legal, safe, and humane refugee flows in line with international law and an end to the fighting between Israel and Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance. The alternative is an increasingly messy and contradictory foreign policy adrift in a region of competing actors looking to drive their interests, possibly at the expense of the US and its allies.