Syria and Turkey are flirting with the idea of a re-normalization initiative following the collapse of talks in mid-2023, sparking a media whirlwind about the potential for the two neighbors-turned-rivals to repair their severely damaged diplomatic relations. Such a move would have profound implications for the Syrian war and regional geopolitical makeup amid one of the most turbulent times in West Asia in recent memory. Yet even under such conditions, not much has changed to significantly alter the outcome of any renewed talks — suggesting any miraculous breakthrough is unlikely today.
Rumors of renewed talks began in early June. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad suggested on multiple occasions that they would be interested in engaging each other’s governments to renew diplomatic relations, albeit on slightly different grounds. Whereas Erdogan expressed interest in direct head-of-state talks “any time,” Assad returned to the conditions that crashed the previous talks — a full Turkish withdrawal from Syria and an end of support for “terrorism,’ his usual line to describe the Syrian opposition and militias in the country’s northwest.
The two positions reflect the realities of the situation for both governments. Syria continues to face an ever-worsening crisis and is one of the world’s premier rogue states, largely cut off from international trade due to Western sanctions as widespread corruption and a low-level conflict envelop the country. Indeed, Assad’s Syria remains split into multiple statelets and can only be considered a playground for international actors looking to test new weapons systems or settle grievances with rivals.
Turkey’s Dilemma
That said, Turkey’s situation is not enviable. It remains stuck in a protracted quagmire on its southern border, having surged Jihadists into the country to destabilize Assad’s regime. Having failed that, it shifted focus largely to a perceived Kurdish threat in Syria’s northeast. As a result, Erdogan faces a crisis at home. After winning re-election in early 2023, his Justice and Development Party (AKP) has experienced difficult political developments that saw his governing coalition lose handedly in local elections in April.
These domestic considerations weigh heavily on Ankara’s thinking as it engages Damascus. As in 2023, ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections, Erdogan is attempting to mollify growing discontent with his government’s Syria strategy, largely due to the presence of roughly 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey.
For many Turks experiencing a deep economic crisis that has largely wiped out their savings, Syrian refugees are an easy target. In this regard, many Turkish citizens want Syrians to return to their country — something that cannot happen without a resolution between the two countries’ long list of grievances against each other as Syria is not safe for return.
Failed State
As such, Assad believes that he holds the leverage. Damascus likely hopes it can play the long game due to Ankara’s seminal interest in preventing any expansion of the Kurdish statelet in northeast Syria — known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES). Turkey views this entity as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and considers the group to be the premier threat to its national security. It will not accept the group’s presence or autonomy on its southeast border.
The Assad family has long been known for their intransigence in such situations, often garnering as much personal gain as possible for itself by playing two competing forces against each other to its benefit. Still, Damascus is hardly negotiating from a position of strength and would gain from any cooling of relations with Ankara. Working with Turkey could place additional pressure on the DAANES and its US sponsor to concede ground to both parties — a win-win. Notably, Syria’s primary backer, Russia, supports such a move.
Assad likely has no qualms about embarrassing Erdogan or forcing him into an election loss.
Thus, several inhibitions are ultimately causing the same bottleneck as in 2023. For one, Erdogan and Assad have an incredibly frosty relationship following what many described as cordial and brotherly before the war. Assad likely has no qualms about embarrassing Erdogan or forcing him into an election loss.
At the same time, Damascus likely does not want to project the appearance of ceding any ground given its weak position. Indeed, Syria is a failed state that is only worsening by the year. Assad likely fears giving anything to entities he does not trust given his power stems exclusively from his ability to manage — or be managed by — warlords and retain close Iranian and Russian ties.
Key Issues
In this context, neither leader can impose conditions on the other, producing the perfect conditions for talks. However, both parties also refuse to meet each other on the most pressing issues — namely Turkey’s presence in Syria and support for the Syrian opposition — as well as a promise from Assad to protect returning refugees from Turkey.
Damascus likely does not want these returnees in the first place and views them with suspicion — a scary prospect for anyone returning to a country with well over 100,000 unresolved enforced disappearance cases. That says nothing of what to do with the millions of people in northwest Syria who despise Assad and protest any Turkey-Syria talks.
As such, the most likely outcome is that talks collapse again, possibly having achieved what minor victories both parties can claim. Herein lies the opportunity for Ankara and Damascus: achieving much smaller deals in a replication of the United Nations’ “step-for-step” approach to engaging Assad’s regime. To be sure, that track has failed — miserably — to achieve any serious results but could work in this context on a variety of issues.
Low Expectations
Regardless, this approach may already be happening, albeit through other parties. Turkey and Russia are reportedly planning to restart joint patrols along the M4 highway connecting northern Syria, stretching from the Iraq-Syria border in Syria’s northeast to Latakia in the northwest. Running through Idlib and Aleppo, the highway has marked a major dividing line between pro-regime and opposition forces for years.
Any renewal of the ceasefire agreement establishing patrols in 2020 would mark a major shift for all stakeholders in Syria as the patrols have not occurred in four years, potentially opening substantial trade opportunities in the process.
Whether third parties like Russia or Iraq — who have volunteered to mediate talks apart from Iran — could foster an agreement remains uncertain. This strategy is likely the only one that will work in the near or medium term, especially if the focus remains on small, pragmatic deals like the M4 highway patrols. Still, it is premature to expect a grand bargain between the two neighboring countries at this stage, regardless of renewed flowery language from their leaders.
Top photo: Around 71,000 people were housed as refugees in the al-Hol camp at the time of Turkey’s military operations in Syria in October 2019 (Y. Boechat/Voice of America)
