On Aug. 5, Sheikh Hasina fled Bangladesh, resigning as prime minister, and giving in to deadly protests that have marred the country since early July. With a death toll just shy of 300 when Hasina left office, many hoped that the removal of an increasingly austere and arbitrary leader, who had ruled Bangladesh uninterrupted for a decade and a half, would end the violence and return stability.
This, however, hasn’t happened. Since Hasina’s ouster and the subsequent appointment of Mohammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, as leader of an interim government, violence has continued. Local media has reported a rise in casualties to 560. Among the recent victims are those from the country’s Hindu community, raising the prospect of communal violence in addition to an already fraught and bloody political environment. In 1946, Bengal marked the starting point for the communal killings that would define British India’s partition. Seventy-eight years later, Bangladesh and its neighbors must ensure that such anarchy cannot take hold once more.
Until July, Hasina had led a formidable political career. She was the longest-serving female leader in the Muslim world and a champion of democracy in a country that has otherwise had a troubled history of military rule. Yet, Hasina had faced criticism for reneging on many of the ideals that once spurred her into politics, following the brutal assassination of her three brothers, mother, and father, the founder of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Rahman had been a leading intellectual behind the movement for an independent Bangladesh in the years preceding the 1971 war with Pakistan, and it was this connection to her father that arguably led to Hasina’s biggest political blunder, ending — for now — a political dynasty that has sat at the apex of the country for nearly half of its existence.
Crisis over Quotas
In the aftermath of Bangladesh’s liberation war in 1971, Hasina’s father introduced a quota system ensuring that the families of those who fought against the West Pakistan-dominated military were rewarded with civil service jobs in the country’s new government. This law remained in place in some form or another until the 2018 election campaign. Hasina, then going for her third straight election victory, yielded to protestors demanding its removal on the basis of fairness. The quota system had also politicized the civil service, packing the government machinery with the now-grandchildren of those who had fought alongside the Awami League, Hasina’s party, and were therefore inclined to be more supportive of it.
Hasina would emerge victorious from the election, amid allegations of violence, voter intimidation, and rigging. However, the quota law would remain sidelined, despite the Awami League’s support for it.
Until July, Hasina had led a formidable political career.
The 2018 protests left a clear mark on the prime minister and her party, underscoring an alarming vulnerability to the masses, despite its tightening grip on the electoral process. Hasina would, as a result, not meddle with the idea of reintroducing a quota for the entirety of her third successive term, and the protestors appeared to have achieved a hard-fought victory against their government.
This victory was, however, short-lived. This June, Bangladesh’s High Court called on the government to reinstate the quota on families of 1971 war veterans. While the Awami League may well be firm supporters of the quota, the High Court’s decision came at a politically inopportune moment for Hasina, who had just won her most contentious election to date.
Long Road Ahead
In mid-January, the Awami League had picked up three-quarters of the available seats in Bangladesh’s parliament, the Jatiya Sangsad, aided largely by a boycott from the country’s opposition party the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The US State Department subsequently criticized the elections as “not free or fair.”
The latter led to counter-accusations of outside interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. Hasina erred massively when she chose to brand protestors as “razakars,”, a term used to describe those who collaborated with the Pakistani military during the 1971 war. The comment only revealed the perceived entitlement the Awami League and its supporters felt with regard to top government jobs, due to the role their predecessors played in the war.
Inevitably, the latest installment of anti-quota protests would prove insurmountable for Hasina, even with a last-ditch attempt from the Supreme Court to quell discontent by reversing the High Court’s judgment and scrapping the quotas once more.
Hasina’s departure may have finally settled the quota issue. Still, a long road remains ahead for the people of Bangladesh. Hasina leaving was only half of the battle. The real challenge now lies in rebuilding a democratic system of government that can successfully avoid a descent into further polarization and violence.
Although the initial reading of events is not hopeful. Reports have already circulated online and in local media of reprisals against Bangladesh’s sizable Hindu minority, who some view as supporters of Hasina’s Awami League. Alongside these recorded attacks, communal tensions have risen further with the aid of online misinformation, which has heightened the sense of angst among the country’s Hindu population, playing only into the hands of those seeking to target the country’s largest minority group.
Bad Faith Actors
Hindus are not the only group being targeted either, with reports of at least 200 attacks against the country’s other minority groups, including Christians, Buddhists, and Ahmadis. Such attacks coupled with the toppling of Sheikh Rahman’s statue, erected to symbolize Bangladesh’s hard-fought freedom from an oppressive West Pakistani military regime, suggest that this outpouring of violence and disorder is confused in nature and has been co-opted by bad faith actors.
Historically, Sufism has had a strong influence on Bangladesh’s Sunni majority version of Islam. Saudi Arabia’s efforts to export its brand of Wahhabism to Bangladesh have led to calls for Islam to play a greater role in Bangladesh’s governance in recent decades. In response, Hasina enforced — often forcibly — her more secular vision for the country, repressing religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami. Yet in her absence, such parties could seek to gain more involvement in the country’s government. Hasina’s previous repression may in turn drive an impending resurgence in popularity of these groups, as some analysts have already noted. This outcome would be hugely detrimental to the social fabric of Bangladesh, with parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami seeking to further polarize issues for their own gain.
Looking further afield, an unstable Bangladesh poses a security challenge for India, while presenting a potential opportunity for China. Bangladesh is India’s largest regional trade partner, with the pair sharing increasingly important economic and diplomatic ties in recent years.
Trade at Risk
With Hasina out of the picture, however, the pair’s $13 billion trade relationship is already at risk, with no certainty that a new government will continue to cultivate this connection with the country’s western neighbor in the same manner as the former Prime Minister. Should Bangladesh pivot away from India, then an already tense neighborhood becomes even more troubling for New Delhi.
This is especially the case if entities in Bangladesh seek closer cooperation with China, with more damaging implications than just a reduction in trade. With the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and its leader, Hasina’s long-time rival Khaleda Zia, waiting in the wings a repositioning of Bangladesh’s foreign relations may well take place. After all, the BNP had as recently as March of this year called for the re-establishing of contact with China.
Regional and International Ramifications
India already faces perennial tensions with Pakistan to the west, which has the potential to flare up at any time, even in spite of the latter’s own domestic security troubles. Meanwhile, the Sino-Indian border continues to be a pressure point for the Indian military, with sporadic Chinese incursions used as a tool of irregular warfare by Beijing.
This is not to mention the other ways China has attempted to tilt the geopolitical landscape in its favor, from co-opting communist political parties in Nepal, to fabricating territorial trade-offs with Bhutan. Thus, a potential opening in Bangladesh to usurp Indian influence in what is arguably its last remaining regional ally presents an enticing opportunity for China to further disrupt the balance of power.
As a Quad member, India’s security is crucial to the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy. However, Washington cannot expect New Delhi to assist its strategic aims in the South China Sea if India faces suffocating pressure from Beijing along its own borders. How Bangladesh emerges from this tumultuous period, therefore, holds significant implications for the future not just domestically but regionally — and potentially internationally as well.
