The US invasion of Afghanistan cost taxpayers over $2.3 trillion and claimed the lives of more than 243,000 people. Determined to never repeat such a costly and misguided endeavor, Congress created the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Over several years, SIGAR produced a series of sobering “Lessons Learned” reports that detailed not just tactical failures, but structural ones: incoherent strategy, constant turnover of key personnel, failures of monitoring and evaluation, and a lack of contextual understanding.
At the core of SIGAR’s findings was a warning: when policymaking is stripped of continuity, transparency, and informed decision-making, even the most well-funded missions collapse. The fall of Kabul in 2021 was not a surprise to those who paid attention to these warnings, but rather a grim confirmation. For a while, it seemed like the federal government was actually taking steps toward this goal: it prioritized collaboration between agencies, encouraged dissent, and even called for renewed cooperation between the public and private sectors.
And yet, history sighs and repeats itself.
On May 23, President Donald Trump gutted the size of the National Security Council (NSC), giving analysts and aides a mere 30 minutes to clear their belongings. While many of these experienced officers have been reassigned to their original agencies, their valuable expertise will no longer directly inform national security decisions, as the administration shifts toward a more centralized, top-down leadership style.
*
Proposals to reshape the NSC have become a recurring feature of American political discourse. Under President George HW Bush, the NSC comprised roughly 50 staffers, but this number surged to over 200 in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks. Subsequent administrations attempted to scale it back: President Barack Obama reduced NSC staff by 15% in 2016, and President Trump attempted to bring it down to around 110 personnel during his first term. President Biden reversed this trend, expanding the NSC to between 350 and 370 staffers, reflecting his concern with cybersecurity and Chinese aggression. Now, in his second term, President Trump has once again moved to drastically reduce its size.
Since returning to office in January, Trump has aimed to overhaul Washington’s bureaucratic machinery in pursuit of what he calls his “America First” agenda. Within weeks, he placed hundreds of NSC staffers — both aides and analysts — on administrative leave, citing a need for greater efficiency. He dismissed National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, reportedly for advocating the diplomatic isolation of Vladimir Putin and for including a journalist in a Signal group chat discussing US strikes in Yemen. Most recently, Trump ordered the downsizing of the NSC, presumably returning it to its previous reduced level of 110 staffers.
What alarms many experts on the War on Terror is not merely the reduction in NSC personnel, but the governing philosophy it reflects. With this move, Trump’s foreign policy strategy will largely court recommendations from top-level cabinet members who align with his agenda.
*
Trump’s top-down leadership style, where the NSC is relegated to executing directives rather than contributing to deliberation, is deeply concerning considering the “Lessons Learned” from Afghanistan. It risks sidelining expert analysis, weakening interagency coordination, and eliminating dissent from the national security decision-making process. A system of impulsive, top-down decision-making gambles with repeating the very failures that SIGAR warned of: the erosion of institutional memory, lack of strategic coherence, and an aversion to critical oversight.
The strength of the NSC has never been its size, but its function as a hub for interagency coordination, rigorous analysis, and long-term strategic planning. When staffed and empowered appropriately, it serves as a critical buffer against reactive policymaking and geopolitical missteps. Specifically, it incorporates experts and analysts from various federal departments who coordinate closely to ensure strategic continuity in the US national security strategy. Undermining its role in favor of a loyalty-based inner circle not only concentrates power but narrows the scope of expertise informing Washington’s most consequential decisions.
Trump’s foreign policy strategy will largely court recommendations from top-level cabinet members who align with his agenda.
The consequences of such a shift extend beyond bureaucratic reshuffling; they affect lives abroad and credibility at home. As the US navigates rising global instability from renewed great-power competition to asymmetric threats in the Middle East and Africa, the margin for error is slim.
The most significant asset of the NSC is its structure: a diverse assembly of experts from across government agencies who analyze, debate, and advocate on overlapping issues using a variety of methods and perspectives. This approach helps ensure that emerging threats are thoroughly assessed and addressed with strategic depth, so that we never find ourselves locked into another Afghanistan. Policymaking rooted in ideology rather than informed deliberation risks repeating old mistakes under new guises.
*
To ensure the NSC functions effectively, it should take SIGAR’s lessons to heart, irrespective of its size. Decisions made by the NSC must be transparent, collaborative, consistent, and open to debate. To dismiss hundreds of staffers and prioritize a top-down model flies in the face of their recommendations.
As the world becomes more dangerous, with more active conflicts than at any time since World War II, it’s more urgent than ever to ground national security decisions in expert analysis, debate, and long-term planning. SIGAR’s “Lessons Learned” were not just bureaucratic paperwork. They were a testament on behalf of the soldiers and civilians who died as a result of ineffective foreign policy. Entering another Afghanistan wouldn’t just waste money — it would mean more lives lost, more refugees displaced, and more instability spreading across regions already struggling. That’s precisely what is at stake if we continue to destroy the system created to prevent such a disaster.
To ignore the recommendations of SIGAR is not just to disregard the cost of past failures, but to guarantee their return.
