Over the past year, Pakistan has increasingly sought to portray itself as the rightful heir to the Indus Valley Civilization in an apparent attempt to strengthen its position in its diplomatic dispute with India over the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Historically, Pakistan has more commonly grounded its national identity primarily in South Asia’s Islamic history, drawing upon the legacy of the Mughal Empire to reinforce state legitimacy and cultivate ties with Muslim countries across the Middle East, Turkey, and beyond. More recently, though, Pakistan’s military-political hybrid leadership appears to have recognized the value of emphasizing its connection to the ancient civilization that once spanned parts of present-day Pakistan and northwestern India. Yet, regardless of how long the IWT remains in abeyance, invoking this heritage will do little to address the structural problems at the heart of Pakistan’s water insecurity.
India had placed the IWT in abeyance just one day after last year’s deadly attack in the Himalayan town of Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir killed 26 civilians. The attack had been carried out by The Resistance Front (TRF), a proxy of the Pakistani-based, and United Nations-designated, terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). New Delhi immediately charged Islamabad with responsibility for the attack and responded with a series of punitive measures against its neighbor, including placing restrictions on bilateral trade and travel. By far the most consequential step taken by India, however, was to place the treaty in abeyance. Brokered by the World Bank and signed in 1960, the IWT divided the six rivers of the Indus Basin between the two states, with Pakistan receiving the three western rivers of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, while India retained control of the eastern rivers of the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. It was ultimately intended to safeguard Pakistan’s access to water.
New Delhi has sought to renegotiate the treaty for years, formally notifying Pakistan of its desire to modify the pact in January 2023. Back when the treaty was signed, India accepted constraints on the development of its upstream projects in order to take Pakistan’s interests into account, even though doing so limited India’s own capacity to make use of the full potential of the Indus basin.
The treaty also included substantial concessions by India, most notably the allocation of approximately 80% of the Indus river system’s water to Pakistan. This was despite India’s claim to a considerably larger share, around 42%, according to its population and the extent of its cultivated land. India further agreed to contribute £62 million towards the construction of Pakistan’s irrigation infrastructure, a sum equivalent to roughly $2.5 billion today. Pakistan, on the other hand, was not required to provide any financial contribution of its own and has been consistently unwilling to engage in substantive negotiations. Even so, India had continued to observe the treaty despite Islamabad’s repeated reluctance to discuss amendments. Since announcing the treaty’s postponement, India has adopted an increasingly assertive tone over the future of the western rivers. In this regard, Pakistan finds itself in an acutely vulnerable position, with roughly 80% of the country’s surface water originating from the Indus Basin.
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It was only after the Pahalgam attack that India chose to use the IWT as leverage in pursuit of its long-standing objective of compelling Pakistan to curb support for terrorist groups operating against India. Pakistan has explored a variety of diplomatic and legal avenues to force India’s hand on this issue, from questioning the legality of the abeyance to issuing threats of military reprisals and even nuclear war.
Amid the many attempts to force a resumption of the IWT, which has included appeals to the United Nations Security Council and a daylong conference on the issue at the end of June, Pakistan has sought to invoke a far older source of legitimacy, appealing to the ancient Indus Valley Civilization as a means of attaining international support for its cause. Employing history it has largely ignored to advance a contemporary geopolitical objective is hardly unique to Pakistan. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly invoked the shared heritage of his people and the Ukrainians, denying Ukraine’s distinct historical identity, before launching Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in 2022. Likewise, China frequently relies upon selective historical narratives to justify its territorial claims throughout the Himalayas, South China Sea, and beyond. History has shown that such historical revisionism often results in increased tensions, and, in many cases, even war. If Pakistan is consciously adopting a similar approach, then it could suggest a desire to restart open hostilities with India, following the military confrontation of May 2025.
The ancient animist civilization did indeed flourish throughout territory that now spans modern-day Pakistan as well as India. In this regard, Pakistan’s desire to make the connection is not necessarily ahistorical, as it often is with Russian and Chinese revisionism. Still, it is a break from the typical historical narratives employed by Pakistan throughout its history, raising the question of why its political leadership has chosen to elevate it at this particular moment.
For decades, Pakistan’s historical narrative has been rooted primarily in its Islamic identity rather than its ancient, pre-Islamic past. This sudden emphasis on an ancient civilization appears conspicuously opportunistic and may well be intended to pre-empt justification for future military action against India. If Pakistan can convincingly make the claim domestically that its access to the Indus waters is a matter of historical sovereignty, rather than merely a legal entitlement that can be revoked, then it could allow the government to portray a military solution to the problem as a defensive, rather than offensive, action.
Increasingly heated rhetoric aside, a renewed large-scale conflict remains unlikely in the near term. This is despite close attention on the issue from Pakistan’s military leadership, including army chief Asim Munir who pledged to consider “all measures necessary” to attain Pakistan’s “rightful share” of the Indus Waters. Equally, India’s decision to place the treaty in abeyance should be understood as an act of diplomatic pressure, rather than an immediate attempt to halt the flow of the western rivers. In the short to medium term, New Delhi lacks both the financial and political will necessary to completely shut off Islamabad’s water supply.
Ultimately, decisions taken in New Delhi regarding the Indus waters were substantially less impactful than the structural and climate issues facing Islamabad. Negotiated nearly 70 years ago, the IWT reflects environmental conditions that no longer exist and does not account for the extreme climate problems that are now a routine in South Asia. Meanwhile, poor water governance, including inefficient irrigation techniques, widespread pollution, and inadequate flood and drought forecasting, contribute far more to Pakistan’s water woes than anything India can do. Data suggests that approximately one third of Pakistan’s water supply reaches the sea without being utilized. At the same time, the widespread use of private tube wells has contributed to excessive groundwater extraction, with water tables reportedly falling by around 1.5 meters each year. These figures suggest a serious weakness in Pakistan’s water allocation system and persistent failures to plan effectively for long term sustainability in its water policy.
Pakistan’s water distribution has also historically reflected the relative political importance of its regions, rather than their differing water requirements. Since signing the IWT, Pakistan has developed what has been described as an “obsession” with dam construction, reducing the natural flow of freshwater, and increasing the country’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change. Much of this dam-building program has been directed towards meeting the energy requirements of Punjab, the traditional center of military and political power in Pakistan. Given the military’s increasingly prominent role in Pakistan’s water governance, this is an unsurprising development.
Pakistan is in bad need of major improvements in governance and water management. Meanwhile, war cries, heated rhetoric, and appeals to ancient history will do nothing to secure the country’s long-term water security.
Top photo: A river in Pakistan’s Neelam Valley, which is tied to the Indus River Network, is shown in August 2020 (Aamir Junaid/Unsplash)
