Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent Kazakhstan inherited physical infrastructure from the world’s largest nuclear weapons program. The Semipalatinsk test site — also known as “The Polygon” — was home to 456 nuclear tests between 1949 and 1989, creating a total explosive yield larger than 250 times the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Thousands of people in the central Asian country have experienced birth defects and cancer linked to nuclear testing, and the surrounding area still presents serious radiation danger.
As Kazakhstan continues to grapple with this legacy, the government and its people face a new nuclear dilemma: whether or not to build a nuclear power plant on Kazakhstan’s territory. Nuclear power is not new for the country. As Timur Zhantikin, General Director of Kazakhstan Nuclear Power Plants LLP, explained at a meeting between experts held in Almaty in June 2023, “The project to build a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan was considered back in the last century.”
Between 1973 and 1999, Kazakhstan operated a Soviet-designed nuclear fast reactor near the city of Aktau for power and desalination purposes. Vice-Minister of Energy Sungat Yessimkhanov told delegates at an April 2024 World Nuclear Spotlight Kazakhstan event in Almaty that “nuclear is already a critical component of Kazakhstan’s identity.” With three research reactors currently in operation and 12% of the world’s uranium resources, along with its status as the world’s top uranium producer, the precedent has been set for nuclear power in Kazakhstan.
Aging Energy Infrastructure
Alongside this precedent comes a growing need for increased power. Systemic power outages over the last several years draw attention to the fact that Soviet-era energy infrastructure is aging while demand for energy is growing. Energy officials in Kazakhstan have predicted that electricity shortfalls and unscheduled blackouts will continue to be a pressing issue in the country, potentially increasing reliance on energy imports if the government doesn’t act soon.
In the past, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has definitively prescribed nuclear power as the solution to this growing problem. The president addressed a February 2022 government meeting with the concern that without clean nuclear energy, Kazakhstan “will lose the entire economy, not to mention investments, and lose regional leadership.” Here, Tokayev cited arguments from the pro-nuclear power camp that praise the potential for economic and technological growth spurred by the development of the nuclear power plant.
“The development of nuclear energy will give impetus not only to the development of the energy sector, but will also raise the technological and scientific level of our country,” said Zhantikin.
Vladimir Vityuk, Deputy Director General for Science at the National Nuclear Center in Kazakhstan, further explained that nuclear power serves as a catalyst for innovation in other sectors. “As soon as we talk about implementing such a large-scale and knowledge-intensive project, the need immediately arises to develop other industries in parallel: construction, science, and some other areas. That is, the nuclear power plant becomes the locomotive for the development of these industries,” he said.
Not All Positive
Advocates for nuclear power also cite this technology’s capability for sustainable energy production. Former Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov explained to representatives from the European Union in a summer 2023 meeting that sustainable development is a key component of Kazakhstan’s environmental agenda. With minimal greenhouse gas emissions, this nuclear energy project could represent a significant step towards Kazakhstan’s ambitious goal to become a carbon-neutral country by 2060 while furthering the country’s contributions to global sustainability initiatives.
Of course, the implications of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan are not all so positive. The small village of Ulken, located on the southern shore of Lake Balkhash, serves as the proposed site for Kazakhstan’s new nuclear power plant. As a key source of drinking water for the Kazakh city of Almaty and one of Asia’s largest lakes, Lake Balkhash is of crucial importance for the region. Unfortunately, the lake is already under stress.
Development in China’s Xinjiang province spurred by the Ili River — which contributes 80% of the water in Lake Balkhash — threatens the stability of the lake. Water withdrawal from the lake for the nuclear power plant, combined with the plant’s pollution threats, contribute additional strain. Even without a nuclear power plant, Lake Balkhash’s fundamental survival is at risk. The addition of a nuclear power plant on its shores could pose an existential threat for water security in Lake Balkhash and consequently in the region as a whole.
Public Input
President Tokayev has decided to give the public a voice in this debate. Shifting the focus away from his own support for the issue, Tokayev announced in the fall of 2023 that a national referendum on Oct. 6, 2024, would determine the nuclear power plant’s construction.
The decision to ask the public for input on the question of nuclear power poses an interesting question: what role does public opinion really play in Kazakhstan, and what kind of power do citizens have to steer the trajectory of their country? Critics have been quick to argue that the scheduled referendum is simply posturing.
Olzhas Beksultanov, an activist with the political reform movement Oyan, Qazakstan claimed “such strategic issues are decided from above, and a popular vote allows the authorities to shift responsibility to the people.” Though this may be a legitimate claim, recent events in Kazakhstan have forced the government to accept that public opinion does play a role in its legitimacy, and dissatisfaction with the regime can seriously impact its ability to rule.
“Bloody January”
In January 2022, relatively peaceful protests over fuel prices escalated into mass riots, culminating in a power struggle between citizens and law enforcement. Kazakhs refer to it as “Bloody January.” Beginning in Almaty and spreading throughout the country, these protests took 238 lives and injured many more. Originally, President Tokayev claimed that up to 20,000 terrorists had instigated the violence, though these claims remain unsubstantiated, and Kazakhstan’s chief prosecutor later retracted this number.
What really happened remains clouded in secrecy, but it is clear that protestors had reached a boiling point with frustrations over the corruption and economic difficulties they had come to expect under former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Though Nazarbayev stepped down in 2019 (after three decades in office), many viewed him as the puppet master behind Tokayev’s administration. Expressing their distaste for Nazarbayev and calling for him to step out of power for good, protestors in Astana shouted “Shal, ket” (“old man, out!”), referring to the former ruler.
In January 2022, relatively peaceful protests over fuel prices escalated into mass riots, culminating in a power struggle between citizens and law enforcement.
Though the relatives of those killed during the January unrest still wait for the government to hold law enforcement accountable, the aftermath of the protests has seen substantive change in Tokayev’s regime. For one, after calling on Putin to intervene through the deployment of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) troops, Tokayev cemented his role as leader of the country despite objections from Nazarbayev’s entourage. Exactly one day before the last CSTO soldier exited Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev went on national television to announce his retirement.
“New Kazakhstan”
Secondly, Tokayev has been eager to establish himself as a reformer following the January violence. As part of a campaign he called “New Kazakhstan,” the president spearheaded an initiative for a constitutional referendum to decentralize decision making and place term limits on the presidential office. The changes also strengthened parliament and stripped Nazarbayev of the constitutional title of Elbasy, or Leader of the Nation. According to Nurlan Abdirov, chair of the national electoral commission, 77.17% of voters backed the move, while 18.66% voted against.
It is important to mention that Tokayev has not granted all concessions demanded by January protesters. Tokayev’s opponents, according to Al Jazeera English, emphasize that the referendum “is an attempt by Tokayev to legitimize his rule and formalize the retirement of his predecessor through amendments drafted without the participation of civil society.” Notably, there was no visible “no” campaign in the months leading up to the referendum.
Though admittedly limited in scope, the constitutional referendum is indicative of the growing importance of public opinion in Kazakhstan, and the upcoming referendum on nuclear power will take place within this legacy. As Tokayev learned during Bloody January, “a stifled people is like a blocked river; it becomes extremely dangerous if the ruler does not know that the people are angry after they are forbidden to speak out.”
As professors Jidong Chen and Yiqing Xu explain in a 2017 study on public opinion under authoritarian regimes, “[V]ertical information flows enable the government to respond efficiently to the fluctuating public opinion and reduce the risk of collective action by meeting the policy wishes of citizens.”
The constitutional referendum, as well as the upcoming referendum on nuclear power, signal that Tokayev is learning this lesson.
Divided Opinion
Public opinion polls show division over the nuclear power issue. A DEMOSCOPE survey found that 46.6% of respondents supported the initiative to build a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, while 37.7% expressed opposition.
Citizens also have divided views on the upcoming referendum’s reliability. The same poll asked respondents about their potential confidence in referendum results. Some 56.9% believe that the results of the popular vote are more likely to be trusted, while 32.4% expressed distrust of the results of the upcoming referendum.
The nuclear power project’s significance is not merely domestic. While providing definition to the role of public opinion within the country, it will also lend clarity to Kazakhstan’s geopolitical position in the region. In building the plant, Kazakhstan will have to decide who will provide technology for the two nuclear reactors. Four countries — France, South Korea, Russia, and China — are up for consideration.
It’s not uncommon to frame Kazakhstan, located between Russia and China, as a pawn in the great power competition. The conversation focuses on these powers’ interest in Kazakhstan as a means to an end, and sometimes less on Kazakhstan’s own strategic foreign policy interests. Though many claim Russia is the only legitimate option given the historical relationship between the countries, this decision will give Kazakhstan the chance to assert its own agency in this sphere regardless of its choice.
In this way, the nuclear power plant gives Kazakhstan a voice in great power politics just as it illuminates the voice of its citizens. While citizens anticipate the day their voice will be heard, Kazakhstan’s allies await this important geopolitical decision — a decision that will impact the country’s relationships for decades to come.
