Washington carries an outsized impact on international affairs across the world — for better or worse. This reality makes policy questions ahead of the US presidential election crucial as the worst crisis in the Middle East in decades continues to ravage the region. While many hope for a policy change — albeit sometimes in drastically different directions — the inertia of US foreign policy in the Middle East is likely to carry many of the same approaches under either presidential candidate in the future.
At the forefront of Middle East policy today sits the Israel-Palestine conflict. The issue remains a major sticking point for key communities in the US and, as such, garners significant attention from both former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris.
Israel-Palestine
Yet neither candidate will likely shift far from the norms dictating decades of US policy on this front. Harris would likely continue President Joe Biden’s approach to Israel, avoiding public criticism and other decisions that could further poison the well between the two countries.
To be sure, Harris has been more outspoken about Palestinian suffering during Israel’s war with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and its other so-called Axis of Resistance allies. However, her position on the Israel-Palestine conflict is much closer to the establishment wing of her Democratic Party than its progressive wing — something policy will likely reflect.
“Yet neither candidate will likely shift far from the norms dictating decades of US policy on this front.”
Trump, as in his first term, will almost certainly lean heavily into this pro-Israel strand of US foreign policy. Given that history — which witnessed Washington move its embassy to Jerusalem, recognize Israel’s “sovereignty” over the illegally occupied Golan Heights, and produce a one-sided Israeli-Palestinian peace deal that ceded massive pieces of the West Bank to Israel — one can expect more of the same through policy.
One important question to ponder is the extent of that support. Harris is the most likely of the two to potentially limit the worst Israeli excesses through coercive policy, whereas Trump may be willing to empower those excesses. However, given Trump’s refusal to bomb Iran after an unprecedented attack on Saudi oil refineries in 2019, could he have limits on willingness to use military force in the region? Ultimately, the “personnel is policy” mantra will play a big role, while understanding Trump’s repeated boast of starting no new wars during his first term.
The Abraham Accords
The Abraham Accords play a major role in this dynamic, particularly as US officials working for both candidates uniformly agree on its importance to overarching regional policy priorities. At present, those priorities resemble an offshore balancing strategy — an approach that empowers an ally or allies against a common foe to limit direct involvement in a region’s affairs. In this case, both camps envision Israel and aligned Arab state neighbors playing that role against Iran but based on a flawed framework centralizing US security guarantees.
Harris would likely continue Biden’s efforts to advance the Abraham Accords, with a focus on Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization. This has remained a policy priority for the Biden administration, even with prospects of a deal mostly dimming at this point. That deal would involve US security guarantees and nuclear energy relations between Riyadh and Washington in exchange for normalization with Israel.
Trump would push the accords as part of his deal-making approach to foreign policy, especially given his staunch pro-Israel and anti-Iran positions. His team will view this as a natural extension of his first term and, given his good relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia, would only face real issues on the Palestine front. Riyadh continues to stress that it will not normalize with Israel short of a Palestinian state — a position that was possible to avoid pre-Oct. 7 but is unavoidable today given widespread Arab anger at Israel for its war in Gaza.
Whether Riyadh’s position will change with time remains uncertain, but it will have an outsized impact on the reality of any normalization deal. At present, it does not seem realistic given renewed emotions surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict.
What to do with Iran?
The final major piece that will draw substantial attention from both Trump and Harris in a future administration is Iran. Washington’s policy toward Tehran has long been hawkish, with US officials viewing the country as the core regional problem. Much of this has to do with a long-running focus on Israel’s security, alongside a US interest in sustaining the free flow of energy products from autocracies across the Middle East in support of stable global energy costs — interests Washington believes Iran threatens.
Harris will likely remain hawkish against Tehran. At present, the regional war between Israel and Iran will not be viewed as conducive to diplomatic overreaches, even with a new reformist Iranian president espousing an interest in talks with the West to lower the temperature. However, given her party’s long-running support for diplomacy with the Islamic Republic, an opening could appear during her term — assuming the current conflict does not deepen.
Trump will return to his “maximum pressure” campaign against the Iranians, mostly surrounded by Iran hawks who built their careers vilifying the country. Yet even this policy appears to have limits, once again returning to Trump’s refusal to bomb Iran in 2019. The lingering question will be one of extent for any Trump-Iran file, alongside the people running it.
More of the Same
Ultimately, while both candidates espouse drastically different visions and tactics, neither seems likely to shift far from the status quo in the Middle East. Other long-term and pressing regional policy issues — including the US military presence in Syria and Iraq, what to do with the Houthis in Yemen, regional economic integration, and ever-difficult US-Turkey relations — are certain to be dictated by the same principles defining much of the last decade of US foreign policy. That looks like continued entanglement in a region where strategy often goes to die at the expense of US interests.
Top photo: Marines with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit watch the sunset as the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima sails through the Suez Canal, June 21, 2015 (US Marines/Wikimedia Commons)
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