After months of difficult negotiations, including a recent uptick in hostilities, the transitional authority in Damascus and the northeast Syria-based Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reached a preliminary agreement on unification talks. While far from complete and facing many challenges, both parties could hopefully be starting to understand each other — albeit amid a tenuous calm that could collapse at any moment. With international influence at play, all major stakeholders in Syria’s transition should continue actions that foster mutual respect and cooperation, helping guide the country through its difficult transition.
Early last month, Aleppo City’s Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods, long under SDF control given the neighborhoods’ Kurdish majorities, witnessed renewed fighting after months of tensions relating to different interpretations of an April deal regarding the areas. That agreement is directly connected to the national-level talks between the government of transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa, on one side, and SDF leader Mazlum Abdi and other leaders from its civilian arm, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), on the other.
Fortunately, the fighting remained relatively low-level, just as it has along the frontlines of Syria’s northeast that separate the SDF from government forces, which also saw an uptick during the violence in Aleppo City. Still, for a moment, it appeared as if this round of hostilities could rapidly expand.
That possibility still remains, especially given the history between the two sides and Syria’s general volatility. The Syrian Army and internal security forces largely constitute former militia factions previously under the umbrella of the Sunni-Arab majority Syrian National Army (SNA) coalition. The SNA and earlier iterations were the primary armed opposition to former President Bashar al-Assad during Syria’s nearly 15-year war.
The multi-ethnic but Kurd-dominated SDF, meanwhile, took a pragmatic tack toward Assad to protect its interests, much to the dismay of the SNA and broader Syrian opposition. This fostered resentment and eventual open hostilities, especially given Turkey’s influence over the SNA and disdain for the SDF, whose People’s Protection Units (YPG) form the backbone of the group alongside substantial Arab components. Ankara considers the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), its arch nemesis.
The rivalry, unfortunately, carries a strong ethnic component, often pitting Sunni Arabs and Kurds against each other. This dynamic played out horrendously in places like Syria’s Afrin, a Kurdish-majority district where hundreds of thousands of ethnic Kurds were forcibly displaced by SNA forces led by Ankara in its assault on the area in 2018. That moment, and broader Kurdish fears of Sunni-Arab reprisals not unlike the massacres occurred in the Alawite-majority Latakia and Tartus Governorates along the coastal northeast or the Druze-majority Suwayda Governorate in the south, informs the talks.
In this context, therefore, the fighting reflects negotiations by other means: namely, using force to shift relative power in talks on governance, reform, and security in the “new” Syria.
Given these high bars to clear in terms of basic issues like trust, the Oct. 7 meeting marks a potential breakthrough amid widespread pessimism surrounding the negotiations. Previously, the two parties achieved a rough framework for ongoing negotiations on March 10, declaring some standard principles for a future deal. However, nearly seven months later, there was little to show for it, in no small part due to the lack of detail in the initial framework and the subsequent disagreements between the parties over defining those details.
Interestingly, the March 10 agreement came just days after the beginning of brutal massacres along the coast. The timing was not a coincidence, with al-Sharaa needing a major political victory and, notably, one with the country’s largest minority group. But stagnation took hold and worsened after the Suwayda massacres in July. But that moment, while giving the SDF/DAANES reason to pause, may have played a role in shifting the talks.
Shortly after the dust settled in Suwayda, US Special Envoy Tom Barrack shifted his rhetoric, suggesting that al-Sharaa needed to consider flexibility on the issue of centralized versus decentralized governance, calling for inclusion of all groups. That subject constitutes the core wedge dividing the transitional authority and multiple minority groups in Syria, including the SDF, who hope to retain hard-fought progress in their areas of control — especially given the country’s long history of marginalizing the Kurds and the east more broadly.
Given the substantial interest in and role of both Washington and Ankara in Syria’s transition, alongside Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, external influence has played a powerful role in the direction of the negotiations on centralization and integration. In this regard, Washington has likely stemmed Ankara’s worst impulses – rejecting any form of autonomy for a Kurdish entity it views as an existential threat – while pushing both parties in the talks at various points to prevent Turkish military action.
Al-Sharaa has also warned against a Turkish invasion against the group, recognizing that any war with the SDF would be bloody, long, and disastrous for the country’s transition. In this scenario, Syria’s Kurdish minority would likely feel pressed to demand independence like the Druze after their confrontation with Damascus. Israel’s ongoing, illegal occupation of southern Syrian territory only worsens these concerns, as many in Israel have expressed an interest in a weakened and Balkanized northeastern neighbor.
That understanding, coupled with the recent fighting in Aleppo City, appears to have led Washington to pressure both parties further — particularly Damascus — out of a desire to avoid a repeat of previous massacres and the unhelpful outcomes that have resulted from them. As such, the Oct. 7 meeting produced notable progress, including on military integration, oil production and profits, and concepts of decentralization alongside calls for unity under any such system.
Yet, even with such progress, key questions remain. The SDF desires military integration that retains their forces as whole units — not unlike that of the SNA factions when they integrated into the Syrian Army. They also demand more equitable resource allocation across Syria, some regional autonomy in governance matters that include local security, and assurances that constitutional reforms will include a democratic form of governance espousing equality across Syria’s diverse population.
Damascus, meanwhile, demands a more centralized form of governance, although this stance has become increasingly pliable. For the transitional authority, it fears division that could aid malign regional actors hoping to fragment Syria — a valid concern. But its failure to rein in its Sunni Arab forces in a country long fearful of the tyranny of the majority do not help its case for rapid integration, unification, and centralization.
US pressure has hit both parties at different periods during the post-war transition, and for good reason. Washington does not hide its desire to pull its forces out of Syria, passing the anti-ISIS campaign to the transitional authorities. It can and does use this as a pressure point on the SDF/DAANES, just as it uses economic incentives like sanctions relief to pressure Damascus. Meanwhile, Washington’s troop presence in northeast Syria and influence over Ankara help prevent Erdogan’s worst instincts, which would ignite Syria again.
The next round of talks, importantly including governorate-level officials on the SDF side, will seek to address the details of security integration and leadership transitions from the SDF/DAANES to the transitional authority. It is imperative that those talks succeed, as Washington likely understands. Deeper integration can be achieved if a real agreement on decentralization has truly been reached. That requires the SDF to make clear that they do not want a breakaway statelet or a federal system on par with Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government — which Abdi has repeatedly clarified, claiming both sides agree on Syria’s territorial integrity.
Against this complicated backdrop, Washington can continue to use its position to support Syria’s transition while indicating its desire to withdraw from the country. In fact, this approach is within its interests and appears to be its focus in recent, overtly positive statements about the SDF-Damascus talks, as a stable Syria and integrated region is good for the Middle East, allowing for a cleaner and broader reorganization of priorities away from the region. US President Donald Trump’s administration is wise to utilize its material assets and influence points in Syria to achieve such an outcome but should not let that process be drawn out or stalled by actors disinterested in a broader US pullout.
Ultimately, neither coerced deals nor words on paper can resolve Syria’s myriad issues. It is up to Syrians first, with the support of the broader region, to advance their transition beyond Assad. Washington is playing a proactive but pragmatic and realistic role today and should continue to do so, understanding that such a role is not indefinite while recognizing the importance of a stabilized Syria to US interests.
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