Protests rattled Turkey in the wake of the March 19 arrest of leading opposition figure, Istanbul mayor, and presidential candidate Ekrem Imamoglu. Critics say the arrest is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s blatant attack on the last vestiges of Turkish democracy, in which all levers of government control aim to obliterate any semblance of resistance while instilling fear and helplessness across the population.
Yet, ironically, Erdogan may be repeating the mistakes of those who tried to keep him down, reflecting a long history of coups and repression in Turkey. Indeed, even the current president faced political repression that led to his rise at the turn of the century. Thus, could today’s anti-democratic assault produce a similar outcome, or can Erdogan wield state power to create a Moscow-style system of one-man rule in Turkey?
Since Turkey’s founding in 1923 under the revered Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the country experienced three verified, major military coups before Erdogan’s rule. The military, long viewed as and accepting the role of protector of the republic, operated as a safety valve over the civilian government, working to retain Ataturk’s founding secular and nationalist principles. Indeed, a strong, centralized government and military leadership in Ankara has typically been the norm throughout Turkey’s history.
The military’s role came to the forefront in Turkey’s first military-led coup in 1960. The ruling Democrat Party — the first political party to control the Turkish government outside of Ataturk’s secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP) — instituted numerous reforms around religion, military service, and press freedoms. As the government inched towards repression, tensions eventually grew to the point that the military ousted both the president and prime minister, executing the latter alongside some ministers.
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That incident laid the groundwork for additional coups in 1971 and 1980 — both against an outgrowth of the banned Democrat Party, the Justice Party. Economic malaise largely drove the military to take power in both instances, with the former takeover feeding into the latter. While the 1971 “Memorandum Coup” was bloodless, the 1980 coup was particularly bloody, with dozens executed and hundreds of thousands arrested to restore order as Turkey’s economy eventually recovered under privatization reforms. The Justice Party was banned after 1980.
However, of particular interest to today’s political crisis is another, less conventional “post-modern coup” in 1997. Following sweeping electoral gains for the Islamist Welfare Party in 1995, the military issued a set of so-called “recommendations” to the government, led by Erdogan mentor Necmettin Erbakan. The Erbakan government understood the risks at play given Turkey’s history and instituted the reforms, which included tightening many religious rights. The Welfare Party was shut down one year later.
Since Turkey’s founding in 1923 under the revered Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the country experienced three verified, major military coups before Erdogan’s rule.
In each case, it is crucial to note that a strong establishment controlling Ankara’s military utilized its extensive power to stifle perceived opposition to its legitimacy and control. This meant secular and nationalist elements could claim roots in Turkey’s founding and against opposition elements like Islamists and liberals. However, Erdogan has now flipped the issue on its head. After all, he leads the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) and, through it, the government and military.
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Indeed, Erdogan has led the effort to use this history under his rule. Witnessing his mentor’s demise — certainly a foundational moment — Erdogan gave fiery speeches against the military and secularists, often citing deep-state repression against Muslims and political freedoms. As a result, he received a four-month sentence in 1998 for “inciting hatred” and religious sedition, leading to his banning from politics.
Following his arrest and the Welfare Party’s collapse in 1998, Erdogan and other party figures established the AKP in 2001 on a populist political platform. One year later, the party won a parliamentary majority but could not elect Erdogan as prime minister, given his political ban. Under the AKP, the Turkish parliament annulled that ban and opened the door for his run in a 2003 special election in eastern Turkey’s Siirt. After Erdogan’s sweeping victory, former Prime Minister Abdullah Gul resigned — clearing the path for Erdogan.
The AKP’s ascent and the Siirt election mark a crucial turning point in Turkish politics. A populist opposition leader with Islamist undertones at the time gained nationwide popularity amid demands for reform, beating back structural impediments designed to keep politicians like him away from power — something Erdogan has not forgotten.
Erdogan and his AKP would go on to claim two separate occasions in which the military supposedly planned or seriously acted upon efforts to institute a coup — namely during the 2007 E-memorandum and 2016 Fethullah Gulen incidents. The 2016 coup attempt is particularly shrouded in mystery. Regardless, Ankara used both instances to sideline the military and any real or perceived opposition, fearing a repeat of the past.
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That fear was realized well before those supposed coup attempts. Erdogan, pushing for European Union membership early in his rule, likely used the accession process and its pro-democracy demands on Turkey to garner international support for sidelining long-running military efforts to overthrow civilian rule — the primary threat to any expansion of his power. Coupled with his widespread popularity due to his ability to adapt his ideological image and garner support from multiple segments of Turkish society at different times, Erdogan was ultimately able to co-opt the military, utilizing broader government purges that ultimately allowed his AKP to take over the government.
Against this backdrop, Turkish history and Erdogan’s rise inform the present. Just as in the past — and particularly the 1997 post-modern coup — today’s ruling Turkish establishment is utilizing all levers of government to prevent a political opposition from wresting power through the democratic process. Just as in the past, that establishment identified a unique political figure in Imamoglu who possessed the political tools to bring that system crashing down.
Indeed, Imamoglu is a uniquely talented politician who can unite typically competing political blocs across Turkey. He proved this in his surprise win of the Istanbul mayorship, uniting nationalists, secularists, and Kurds in a unique political alliance. It is critical to note that Erdogan’s political career skyrocketed from the Istanbul mayorship. Just as Erdogan turned this position into a national project, Imamoglu has too.
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Yet, Imamoglu today faces a political ban for the same frivolous legalities that Erdogan once did. The charges behind that ban stem from Imamoglu’s criticism of the government, expanding to include vague corruption and terrorism charges. Following the success of CHP in the 2024 provincial elections, there is a real expectation that an Imamoglu-led CHP can win the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections slated for March 2028.
That success explains Erdogan’s actions. He refuses to leave power, utilizing his government to ensure his AKP remains entrenched. Even ongoing talks with the Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) regarding Ankara’s decades-old conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) must be viewed through an electoral lens, in which Erdogan hopes to split the CHP-DEM alliance fostered by Imamoglu that would lead to the government’s downfall in any future election.
Whether Erdogan or Imamoglu succeeds will largely depend on public outrage and resilience in Turkey, especially given the AKP’s control of the judiciary and media. While it is far too early to know if Erdogan is in over his head, the parallels to his rise cannot go unmentioned. Thus, what lies ahead in the coming months and years is a crucial test for Turkish democracy.
