The issue of Syrian refugees continues to dominate discourse on the future of Syria following the rapid collapse of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime on Dec. 8. Constituting a policy priority for some Middle Eastern states and many Western governments — particularly in Europe — for a decade, many leaders are publicly signaling their interest in incentivizing or forcing refugee returns to Syria. Such a move at this stage in Syria’s transition is foolish because it could inadvertently upend efforts to build a new Syria in ways that worsen the Syrian displacement crisis.
The issue of Syrian refugees — and refugees and migrants from Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East more broadly — has dominated political discourse in countries across Europe for over a decade. The same can be said of political debates in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.
Forced Returns
As global conflicts and economic stagnation plagued many low- and middle-income countries, a far-right surge brought anti-migrant policies as Western and Middle Eastern publics rejected what they viewed as a burden on their communities. Syrian refugees, constituting one of the worst displacement crises for a country in modern history, were no exception to this dynamic.
Over time, as Syria’s crisis appeared to freeze with no end in sight, many of these countries began engaging the former Assad regime in a pragmatic effort to address what they viewed as an increasingly problematic political issue. The goal was to return Syrian refugees to so-called predetermined safe zones or newly assessed safe areas inside Syria, such as Damascus. These states, including Denmark, The Netherlands, Austria, Lebanon, and Turkey, believed that Assad had effectively won the war, using that assessment to justify these forced return policies.
Assad’s False Victory
But Assad’s de facto victory — namely survival — was not sustainable, nor was the conflict finished. As Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) operation that toppled the regime highlighted, fighting and instability remained central components of Syria’s crisis. Today’s ongoing transition further highlights that reality, even with Assad gone, as most analysts agree Syria’s current state and near-term future leave much to be desired and little to be forecasted with total certainty.
But Assad’s de facto victory — namely survival — was not sustainable, nor was the conflict finished.
Yet, since hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees fled Lebanon for Syria as Israel launched its widespread bombing campaign and invasion of Lebanon, pro-return states have only upped their efforts. This scenario of forced return due to conflict in Syria’s neighboring country, regardless of the reality on the ground, led world leaders to argue that Syria was now safe for widespread returns. Then, Assad fell.
Today, these same countries are instituting asylum freezes out of fear of a new displacement crisis stemming from Syria. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Dec. 17, centralizing migration discussions and awarding Ankara another one billion Euros for migrant-related actions. The visit is a strong signal of Europe’s desire to outsource its migrant issue once again — a role Turkey has long played.
Ongoing Displacement
While Europe and major host countries like Turkey and Lebanon have a strong interest in returning refugees to Syria, the reality on the ground hardly supports those interests. Since the regime’s collapse, economic activity and government services have only slowly restarted, albeit with the latter remaining a major HTS focus limited by scaling issues. Roughly 90% of Syrians live under the poverty line and 13 million suffer from extreme hunger. Jobs are scarce and pay is worse. Intermittent fighting has continued in some parts of the country as few returnees know if they have a home to return to in the first place.
While world leaders point to some Syrian returns since Assad’s fall, the situation is much more complicated. Tens of thousands have reportedly returned to Syria but many are waiting to do so. Tens of thousands have reportedly fled as well, citing concerns about HTS and other radical groups or fearing renewed instability.
Many other returnees are single family members interested in checking in on their properties, not necessarily intent on remaining in-country. With so much up in the air, one can and should be excused for expressing caution concerning any return to their home country — especially Syria.
Given this context, major host countries should not forcibly return Syrian refugees. Legally, they cannot forcibly return them without violating the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in international law. Indeed, Syria is not safe for returns. On a humanitarian level, forcing families to return to a jobless, destabilized, and ongoing conflict zone with a daunting and unpredictable future that could very likely spiral into at any moment is morally repugnant.
More Harm Than Good
A policy of forced return hardly makes sense from a strategic standpoint as well. The new transitional government just began preserving, staffing, and strengthening government institutions, including the Ministry of Interior and other government entities crucial to migration like border controls. The economy cannot handle Syria’s current population, let alone a surge of millions who may likely return to no home or prospects. The United Nations has only secured 28% of the funding its humanitarian operations require, and it can hardly support a surge either.
Thus, at the strategic level, major host countries must understand that surging illegal forced returns risks upending Syria’s transitional period. Such a disastrous outcome would inadvertently contribute to a new migration wave, worsening the problem these states are trying to solve. As the previous migration crisis proves, there is no way to easily contain or address such a problem once it reaches the stage of state failure and total war.
As such, these states and world leaders more broadly would be wise to focus on strengthening government institutions and services while bolstering humanitarian operations across the country. These efforts must coincide with conflict resolution actions in-country, including intensive diplomacy to bring the kaleidoscope of Syrian factions closer together as they build a new Syria. Such actions will contribute to Syria’s stability, promoting natural and voluntary refugee returns when these individuals find it best to do so.
The alternative — jumping the gun on returns — will ultimately cause more harm than good. Recognizing the importance of Syria’s transition by employing strategic patience is crucial today and in the near-term.
