In recent weeks, the United States has spearheaded a new flurry of diplomacy aimed at reaching a settlement to the Russia-Ukraine war. While it remains unclear whether a peace agreement will materialize, it has become more and more evident that Washington is willing to sell out Kyiv at any cost to get a deal done quickly — even as Russian President Vladimir Putin jeopardizes the global order.
Rushing to strike a quick deal is a critical mistake. With Moscow refusing to entertain a deal on anything other than its own terms, the conditions for reaching a just settlement remain absent. Forcing Kyiv into a lopsided agreement would not only suppress its future sovereignty — it would imperil the broader principles underpinning global order.
Since World War II, the norm against territorial conquest — enshrined as international law in the 1945 United Nations Charter — has become remarkably widespread. While interstate war has not disappeared, it has declined dramatically, as its legitimacy as a tool of dispute resolution has evaporated. Evidence of this norm is visible in the language Vladimir Putin uses to camouflage Russia’s war of aggression as a “special military operation” taken in alleged self-defense.
Yet the prohibition on force is in grave danger. Russia has yet to be truly punished for its aggression. Meanwhile, unilateral military action and threats of such action have proliferated globally, coming from countries including the United States, Israel, and more. Perhaps assessing that the trend is in Russia’s favor, the Kremlin has even abandoned its rhetorical cover for the invasion, becoming emboldened enough to openly call it a “war.”
The war in Ukraine is a critical inflection point for the norm against conquest. Preserving this principle will require Kyiv to achieve a settlement that adequately upholds its territorial integrity and sovereignty, denying Moscow its desired fruits of aggression and leaving no doubt that the costs to Russia have outweighed the benefits. Anything less will be a signal to revisionist actors across the world that war is once again an appropriate foreign policy tool, creating a moral hazard with potential ripple effects reaching Taiwan, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and beyond.
For a just peace that upholds the international order, there are several non-negotiables. First, there must be no legal recognition of Russia’s territorial seizures. It is crucial to deny Moscow the ability to legitimize its conquest and to uphold Kyiv’s rightful jurisdiction over its prewar territory, even if reversing Russia’s occupation is impossible for now. Worryingly, the Trump administration has at various times — including in the recent 28-point peace plan — expressed willingness to recognize Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as Russian territory.
While it is crucial that the international community refrain from formally recognizing Russia’s conquests, this is insufficient on its own to signal commitment to the prohibition against force. Russia’s war of aggression is a challenge not only to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but also to its sovereignty. In fact, seizing control of Kyiv’s political decision-making is more important to Putin than seizing control of its physical territory. Preserving Ukraine’s ability to determine its own destiny is essential. This means preventing Russia from having a say over Ukraine’s political leadership, its membership in Western organizations such as NATO or the European Union, or aspects of its defense policy such as the size of its armed forces.
As the failure of negotiation efforts so far demonstrate, getting to such a settlement is not yet possible. Yet finding the path to a just peace is nonetheless increasingly urgent. As we approach the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the human and material costs of conflict continue to mount, while Ukraine’s battlefield position slowly yet steadily erodes. The status quo is unsustainable.
The only way to succeed in the urgent task of achieving a just peace settlement, therefore, is radically reshaping Russia’s calculus. As long as the Kremlin believes that Russia — supported by Iran, China, and North Korea — can outlast Ukraine and its Western backers in a war of attrition, it is unlikely to make the concessions needed to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. To come to the table and engage in good faith negotiations, Putin must feel the pressure.
Tools to ratchet up pressure on Russia are readily available. The Trump administration’s recent new sanctions on the Russian oil sector have the potential to hit hard, but only if strong enforcement measures follow. The United States could also finalize bipartisan sanctions legislation in the Senate that would allow for tariffs of up to 500% on countries that buy Russian energy and have not supported Ukraine. An even stronger signal, while less likely, would be the passage of a new US aid package offering direct financial backing for Kyiv. The European Union, meanwhile, must finalize its plan to provide a €140 billion ($163.6 billion) loan to Kyiv using seized Russian assets. There is also room to scale up weapons deliveries — sending Ukraine Tomahawk missiles, as it has requested, would be one particularly promising avenue with the potential to change the military situation on the ground.
If maximal pressure is to work, there must be some limited prospect of relief for Russia in exchange for scaling back its peace terms. At the same time, if and when a just settlement becomes viable, it is vital to avoid the impression of letting Russia off the hook. Even after the war has ended, Russia’s self-inflicted damage must be unambiguous — both to its own population and to the rest of the world. Full sanctions relief or reintegration of Russia into international organizations such as the G8, as proposed in the recent US peace plan, should therefore be contingent not just on ending the fighting, but on more radical changes down the line, including Russia’s full withdrawal from Ukrainian territory and the payment of reparations for its crimes. Violations of the normative framework underpinning global stability cannot go unpunished.
Indeed, punishment is likely a necessary condition for any future rehabilitation of Russia. No matter how unlikely such a scenario may seem at the moment, at some point Putin will leave power and a new window of opportunity may appear. Only by first turning inward, accounting for its failures, and pursuing radical change will Russia be able to subsequently reemerge as a responsible actor committed to building stable and peaceful relations with other states. This inward turn will not occur absent a push from outside.