“Adults in a Room” is a series in collaboration with The Stimson Center’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy program. The series stems from the group’s monthly networking events that call on analysts to gather virtually and hash out a salient topic. It aims to give you a peek into their Zoom room and a deep understanding of the issue at hand in less than the time it takes to sip your morning coffee without the jargon, acronyms, and stuffiness that often come with expertise.
The United States has embarked on a path to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, at an estimated cost of $1.7 trillion over 30 years. Russia and China have followed suit, and existing arms control agreements are nearing expiration with little hope of renewal. Meanwhile, numerous US allies, concerned about Washington’s reliability as a security guarantor, are more openly discussing developing their own nuclear weapons. These developments raise the risk of a new nuclear arms race and the embrace of tactical nuclear weapons that lower the threshold for nuclear use.
March’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy roundtable brought members of the foreign policy community together to discuss nuclear modernization and proliferation risks. Two guest speakers opened the conversation with an overview of the US nuclear modernization effort and its possible downstream effects. The group discussed and debated the ideal path forward for the US nuclear arsenal and posture, as well as how the Trump administration may approach these issues.
Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director, Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program, Stimson Center
It is not hyperbole to say that the world is on the cusp of a new nuclear arms race. All nuclear weapon states are modernizing their arsenals, and some have plans to dramatically expand both the number and type of delivery vehicles and warheads in their possession. Some of this is abetted by the fact that nearly all major arms control agreements have either expired, will soon expire, or have simply gone ignored or forgotten.
The United States’ plans to modernize its nuclear arsenal, including all three legs of the triad — land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers, and sea-based submarine launch ballistic missiles (SLBMs) — is an expansion of the nuclear weapons enterprise to include new warheads, as well as the consideration of a new class of tactical weapons believed to be essential for deterrence. The price tag is estimated at $1.7 trillion — and counting.
As our recent paper discusses, the rationale for these decisions should be subjected to greater scrutiny. Nuclear superiority may be unachievable, and is not necessary for a credible deterrent. Some of the foundational beliefs about nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, arrived at through painstaking study during the Cold War, remain as relevant today as they were 40 or 50 years ago. As Ronald Reagan famously said, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” a judgment that has been reaffirmed countless times in the intervening years. President Trump has even suggested that he is open to working with Russia and China to limit nuclear weapons.
And yet his administration is poised to continue or even accelerate US nuclear modernization, despite the fact that the programs of record — the Sentinel ICBM, Columbia Class SSBN, and the B-21 Raider strategic bomber – are grossly over budget and behind schedule. The Sentinel, in particular, deserves far greater scrutiny from an administration that has elsewhere pledged to eliminate underperforming programs.
Nuclear weapons are terrifying, and laypeople are understandably reluctant to challenge experts who claim to know how they work, including whether and how they might deter adversaries. But that doesn’t excuse the Trump administration and Congress from conducting meaningful oversight, and holding accountable those responsible for program delays and cost overruns. Only then can they credibly claim to be ensuring that resources are going where they are most needed to preserve Americans’ security and prosperity.
Lucas Ruiz, Fall ’24 Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program, Stimson Center
The Trump administration’s shock-and-awe foreign policy has raised several questions about US security commitments. Extended deterrence, otherwise known as the US “nuclear umbrella,” has come under particular scrutiny, with many pondering its future. Some experts have speculated that withdrawing the umbrella will result in a proliferation cascade. Other international relations observers agree. All operate from the same ahistorical perception of the United States as a benevolent power in the global arena that has opposed proliferation. This story holds if we only consider its actions within a vacuum of the last 30 years, ignoring the American role in supporting the development of the British, French, and Israeli arsenals.
This situation requires serious consideration. However, amid experts’ haste to highlight the geopolitical imperatives intertwined with extended deterrence, their fixation on who they believe will proliferate and how they might do it presents proliferation as inevitable. It is not. Enriching uranium to weapons-grade, developing warhead technology, and conducting live explosive tests all take time. Even nuclear-latent states like South Korea and Japan need between one and three years to acquire and field small arsenals should they decide to pursue the bomb. It is doubtful that China or North Korea would sit idle during this vulnerability window. They could utilize numerous levers of statecraft short of a preemptive strike to prevent their regional neighbors from going nuclear.
Enriching uranium to weapons-grade, developing warhead technology, and conducting live explosive tests all take time.
The idiosyncratic conditions conducive to successful proliferation absent the US security umbrella are impossible to calculate. Although some European countries have begun openly contemplating a bloc-wide nuclear deterrent, achieving this feat is easier said than done. It could take years before European leaders agreed on a framework for cooperation and financing the venture, let alone acquire the technology and resources necessary to begin a nuclear program. France could extend its umbrella, but forward-deploying some of their weapons would require basing agreements and infrastructure projects in Eastern European countries that would take time and stimulate deep-seated Russian insecurities, potentially setting the stage for a European conflict. More importantly, the US and the other nuclear powers would have to be complicit in this endeavor through inaction or direct support for it to succeed.
The evidence suggesting a complicit Trump administration is inconclusive. Indeed, it has sent mixed signals on nuclear policy, among other things. The president has simultaneously called for denuclearization while preserving the US’ $1.7 trillion nuclear modernization-turned-expansion agenda, fueling the growing arms race. Recognizing this could be a moment of profound change in the nuclear status quo, whether for better or for worse, it is imperative to be aware of one’s assumptions before delivering any verdict that might squander a once-in-a-generation opportunity. Rather than relying on the tired methods of allied assurances, military assistance and cooperation, and economic sanctions that have contributed to a global environment only 89 seconds from Midnight (nuclear Armageddon), policymakers in Washington would do well to consider new ways the Trump administration can counteract proliferation in a facilitative manner of arms control and disarmament goals. This opportunity may not reappear if we let it slip away.
William D. Hartung, Senior Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Despite his often combative rhetoric and bullying behavior, Donald Trump has inspired hope among advocates of nuclear arms control that he might take constructive action on this crucially important national security issue.
The first glimmer of hope came in mid-February, when he told reporters gathered in the Oval Office that “There’s no reason for us to be building brand new nuclear weapons, we already have so many, . . . You could destroy the world 50 times over, 100 times over. . . We’re all spending a lot of money that we could be spending on other things that are actually, hopefully much more productive.”
The president went on to say, “One of the first meetings I want to have is with President Xi of China, President Putin of Russia. And I want to say, ‘let’s cut our military budget in half.’ And we can do that, and I think we’ll be able to.”
Since then, his administration has commenced talks with Iran about curbing its nuclear program.
But before we pop the champagne corks, we should compare the president’s rhetoric to his record. In his first term, he tore up a multilateral nuclear deal with Iran that was working, pulled out of an agreement to limit deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles, and failed to extend the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. And nuclear talks with North Korea fell apart, yielding little but a few photo ops.
More recently, rather than pushing to cut the Pentagon budget, Trump has announced plans to push it close to $1 trillion which would be the highest level since World War II, adjusted for inflation. And plans to cut waste in some part of the Pentagon to make room for investments in other defense priorities explicitly exempted cuts in spending on nuclear weapons, despite the assessment of independent experts that intercontinental ballistic missiles are not necessary for deterrence and increase the risk of an accidental nuclear war, even as the new version has experienced an 81% cost overrun just a few years into its development.
Ronald Reagan’s famous statement about nuclear arms control was “trust, but verify.” So far, President Trump’s real world record on nuclear weapons gives little reason to trust his anti-nuclear rhetoric. But the future of humanity demands that we seize on that rhetoric to press for the administration to take concrete steps to make a new round of nuclear arms reductions a reality.
