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Trump’s Return Raises Questions about US Policy in Latin America

Donald Trump is piecing together a team to shape Latin America policy, but will it be up to the task?

Words: Adam Ratzlaff
Pictures: White House
Date:

As President Donald Trump starts his second term, he has rolled out an impressive number of nominations for various diplomatic and national security posts. This has included several senior officials with deep expertise on the Western Hemisphere and filling numerous ambassadorial posts for the region. 

This deep bench of Latin Americanists has sparked a flood of articles suggesting that Latin America and the Caribbean will be a focus for the Trump administration. But while the team is quickly being assembled, the question remains whether they can avoid missteps that will undermine their ability to implement an effective regional foreign policy — a challenge that comes both from the president himself as well as from various members of his team. 

Team Americas, Assemble!

Highlighting the importance of the Americas to Trump’s foreign policy is the team that he quickly rolled out following the election. 

Marco Rubio, the new Secretary of State, has long been outspoken on US-Latin American foreign policy — particularly when it comes to countering Chinese influence, democracy promotion, and US policy toward Cuba. He recently introduced several pieces of legislation on these issues. Backing up Rubio, Trump put forward Christopher Landau as Deputy Secretary of State. Landau previously served as Trump’s ambassador to Mexico. Landau’s father also served as an ambassador to various Latin American countries during Landau’s childhood.

In addition to the deep focus on the Americas among Trump’s senior team at State, Trump rapidly named several candidates to fill key ambassadorships. Trump named 10 ambassadors to the region by the end of 2024, including a nominee to the OAS — a position that the Biden administration did not even nominate an ambassador to until September 2021 and that sat vacant until December 2022. 

History of Regional Engagement

In addition to the OAS, Trump has named ambassadors to Argentina, the Bahamas, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay. Notably, three of these countries did not have a confirmed ambassador and only one of the nominees replaced a career diplomat from the State Department. 

Outside of the State Department, Trump also announced senior officials with important backgrounds looking at the Americas. Two roles in particular stand out in this regard — Mike Waltz’s appointment as National Security Advisor and Mauricio Claver-Carone being named Special Envoy for Latin America. 

Claver-Carone has a long history of engaging on issues related to Latin America, including being the architect of several of the first Trump administration’s Latin American strategies — including some that were quite successful. He previously served as Trump’s Latin America lead at the National Security Council and as the president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) before becoming a managing partner with the LARA Fund—a venture capital fund aimed at promoting investment in Latin America. 

While Waltz has less direct experience with the Americas, his position as a representative from Florida has meant that he has engaged closely with the region and taken positions on numerous critical issues. 

An Americas First Foreign Policy?

It is a good thing that Trump has started to put together a team focused on Inter-American affairs given the number of campaign promises that he made that are closely linked to the Hemisphere. Three areas of his agenda in particular have deep connections to the region: immigration, trade, and countering the rise of China. 

Two of the central enduring components of the Trump platform have been a tough line on immigration and trade. Trump’s focus on immigration has always focused on irregular immigration coming from the Western Hemisphere — despite the fact that most immigration is legal and there is an increase in the number of immigrants coming from other regions. 

Trump has also been a vocal critic of the free trade agenda. With 12 of the 20 countries with free trade agreements located in the Western Hemisphere, Trump’s approach to trade will have to focus on the region — particularly with the review of the US-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) review occurring in 2026.

Chinese Influence in Latin America

Trump has also been critical of China’s role on the world stage, particularly as Chinese engagement in the Americas has continued to expand. 

While the priorities laid out by the Trump administration and by the establishment of his team may promise a deeper focus on Latin America in the upcoming administration, there remain reasons to be skeptical that this will actually occur or lead to an effective US approach to the region. 

Trump has also been critical of China’s role on the world stage, particularly as Chinese engagement in the Americas has continued to expand. 

Despite the president’s intentions to focus on the Americas, US foreign policy is often forced to be reactive and respond to the crises of any given day. This may include far-off challenges that derail Trump’s intentions to focus inward.

At the same time, while the Trump team has deep regional expertise, some of the policies and approaches that they opt for or how they speak about Latin America may not only hinder developing a holistic foreign policy toward the region, but also undermine their own objectives.

Regional Reputations

The deep expertise and experience with the region that some members of the Trump team have may be double-edged. Their understanding and connections in the region could make them skilled interlocutors for achieving the administration’s goals, but the same experience and connections mean that they have developed reputations within the region. This is particularly true for two members of the Trump Latin America team: Marco Rubio and Mauricio Claver-Carone. 

Rubio has been one of the most engaged senators on US-Latin American relations. In fact, he has already announced plans to visit Central America as his first international visit as Secretary of State. He has developed critical partnerships with politicians across the region, but this fact has also put him at odds with some leaders in the region. Furthermore, there are some inconsistencies in his support for democracy in the region.

While Rubio has leveled staunch criticism of the left-wing “troika of tyranny,” he has openly embraced other leaders with less than stellar democratic and human rights records, such as El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. In his mission statement related to his trip to Central America, there is no mention of human rights nor democracy. Additionally, Rubio’s hardline on Cuba will mirror that of the first Trump administration, but this approach has hampered otherwise improved relations with other Latin American countries in the past and is unpopular in much of the region. 

Controversial Nomination

Claver-Carone’s position as special envoy for the Western Hemisphere may also create some challenges for regional cooperation. In 2020, the Trump administration nominated Claver-Carone to the presidency of the Inter-American Development Bank — a critical multilateral lender for the region. The IDB is often viewed as a bank from and for the region, making Claver-Carone’s nomination controversial

Claver-Carone won the presidency, but his tenure brought with it controversy and ended with his removal due to ethics violations. Claver-Carone talked about how the IDB could play a critical role in the Trump administration’s approach to the region during the 2024 campaign, though his removal from the IDB and the sour note that accompanied his election may limit his ability to serve as an envoy to some governments in the region or build support from critical partners within the Inter-American system. 

The Risks of a Monroe Doctrine 2.0

Trump’s approach to and framing of Latin America may also create headwinds for developing a successful hemispheric policy. During the campaign and immediately following the election, many analysts of Trump’s rhetoric, campaign promises, and previous administration argued that he was developing a Monroe Doctrine 2.0.  

The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration dating back to 1823 that was a guiding principle of US-Latin American foreign policy. Many equate it with US imperialism in the region. Reviving the Monroe Doctrine is likely to deter partnerships with key countries in the region that are necessary to push back against Chinese activity in the Americas. Despite this, members of both parties have called for the need for a Monroe Doctrine 2.0 in order to combat Chinese engagement in the region. One of the most vociferous of these voices has been Mike Waltz, Trump’s National Security Advisor. 

The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration dating back to 1823 that was a guiding principle of US-Latin American foreign policy.

The invocation of the Monroe Doctrine is not new to the second Trump administration. During Trump’s first administration, he and various members of the administration noted the need for an update to and revitalization of the Monroe Doctrine. In a speech prior to his first visit to Latin America, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that the Monroe Doctrine was “as relevant today as it was the day it was written.” This drew the ire of the region and dominated media coverage during his visit to the region. Similarly, both Trump and his National Security Advisor, John Bolton, invoked the Monroe Doctrine in their responses to engaging with the democratic crisis in Venezuela and the rising Chinese presence in the region.

Threats of Force

The revival of the Monroe Doctrine goes beyond simply reiterating the need to limit extra-hemispheric influence in the Americas to include the use of force within the region itself. Over the course of the Republican 2024 primaries, several candidates — including Donald Trump — noted their support for sending US troops not only to the US border, but to use the military to go after drug cartels in Mexico itself, a gross violation of norms around sovereignty. 

According to reporting in the LA Times, these threats, coupled with Trump’s nomination of former Green Beret and former ambassador to El Salvador Ron Johnson as ambassador to Mexico, have worried Mexican officials about the possibility of the deployment of US troops to their country. 

Nor is Mexico the only country that Trump has threatened with force. In December, Trump went on Truth Social to lambast Chinese engagement in the Panama Canal and the costs to US companies transporting goods through the canal. He even suggested that the United States might seek to retake control of the Panama Canal — a threat reiterated during his inauguration speech. While Trump allies viewed this as an important update to a Monroe Doctrine 2.0, regional leaders rallied to Panama’s defense. Rubio will also visit the Panama Canal as threats from the White House continue. 

From Monroe to Coercion

On top of the threat of a return to the Monroe Doctrine, Trump and his administration have frequently picked fights with allies in the region. For instance, despite close relations between El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele — particularly with the conservative movement — Trump criticized Bukele during his Republican National Convention speech. Likewise, Trump threatened to increase tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and other countries in the region that have increased trade or political relations with China.

This framing and use of threats has led Latin America analyst James Bosworth to refer to Trump’s approach as a “Coercion-First” Foreign Policy. While this approach might be effective for business, it is likely to dredge up historical baggage and to widen the rift between the United States and its hemispheric neighbors. Recollections of US interventionism in the region and its resulting anti-American sentiment remain strong in the region — evident both in past responses to Trump’s reclamation of the Monroe Doctrine and the decline in regional perceptions of the United States during Trump’s last term. Furthermore, rather than helping Trump bring Latin American leaders closer to the United States, it will likely drive them toward China. 

Trump’s priorities and the team that he has started to assemble suggest that this administration may have a strong focus on the Western Hemisphere. However, while the issues are clear and the team has deep expertise, it is still likely to face challenges that may hinder Trump’s ambitions in the region. The long histories of some of the team in regional politics is a benefit to the administration, but also comes with its own set of baggage. Additionally, how the Trump administration frames the region and what fights it picks may hamper the ability of the administration to engage with the region. More worrying yet, it may reignite historic tensions. 

Adam Ratzlaff

Adam Ratzlaff is a specialist and consultant in Inter-American affairs as well as a member of Diplomatic Courier’s World in 2050 Brain Trust. He has previously worked with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Global Americans, among other groups.

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