Since 2017, President Emmanuel Macron has promoted the idea of extending the protection offered by the French nuclear arsenal to certain European countries. This prospect of “Europeanizing” deterrence is based on the argument of a deteriorating security environment, marked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and uncertainty about the United States’ security guarantees in Europe.
In a speech in early March at the Île Longue base, home to France’s ballistic missile submarines, Macron laid out his vision of “advanced deterrence.” This protection, accepted by seven European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden) and the UK, excludes any sharing of decision-making authority over the French nuclear arsenal and, for the time being, any deployment of weapons on their territories — unlike US arrangements within NATO. The first steps are expected to take the form of a dialogue on collective security guarantees and joint nuclear exercises. This project is designed for the long term, which explains, among other things, the president’s announcement of his intention to increase the number of nuclear weapons (currently close to 300).
Yet this declared intention to “protect” European populations, based on deterrence theory, is inconsistent with the current management of the humanitarian, environmental, and social consequences of the 17 nuclear explosions conducted in the Algerian Sahara and the 193 others carried out in French Polynesia between 1966 and 1996. Assistance for victims (French, Polynesian, and Algerian) and the rehabilitation of contaminated territories remain incomplete, raising questions about France’s claim to be a “responsible nuclear State.”
This inconsistency is particularly evident in the management of the nuclear legacy in the Sahara. Paradoxically, it is now Algeria, a non-nuclear-weapon state, that is taking concrete steps to address these consequences. Long reduced to a diplomatic dispute between Algiers and Paris, the issue is now evolving. Algeria is no longer limited to demanding apologies; it has begun implementing concrete measures to rehabilitate its territory.
Explosions in Algeria exposed French military personnel, civilian workers, and local populations to ionizing radiation, resulting in numerous radiation-induced illnesses. Environmentally, the legacy is equally troubling. Algerian researchers have mapped the atmospheric test area of Hammoudia, near Reggane, identifying 421,679 fragments of contaminated sand spread across an area of approximately 4,814 square kilometers (1,859 square miles). These findings highlight the scale of the environmental challenge.
In addition, radioactive waste was deliberately buried under the sand: scrap metal, aircraft, trucks used during the explosions. The presence of such materials underscores France’s obligation to act responsibly and ensure transparency regarding technical and topographical archives. Yet to date, the French executive remains silent and refuses to open the archives related to this period.
Faced with this situation, Algeria has structured a national agenda. In 2021, it created a National Agency tasked with rehabilitating former French nuclear explosion sites in the south of the country.
President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and the Algerian chief of staff have repeatedly and officially called on France to provide the maps needed to precisely locate buried waste and to assume responsibility for rehabilitation operations. The Algerian Parliament has also taken up the issue. On Feb. 13, 2025, the National People’s Assembly organized, for the first time, a study day dedicated to French nuclear explosions in Algeria. Ten recommendations were adopted, including the creation of a National Center for Nuclear Memory. This marks the institutionalization of the issue at the national level.
At the international level, Algeria has also strengthened its engagement. In September 2025, during the 69th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it organized a side event, much to the displeasure of French diplomacy, on the remediation of contaminated sites. In October 2025, Algeria co-sponsored a United Nations resolution entitled “Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons,” calling for an international meeting on victim assistance and environmental remediation. The meeting will take place on April 24, 2026. In addition, work is underway at the African level. And the African Union formally recognized the “Algiers Declaration” on colonial crimes, which calls for assessing the ecological impact of colonialism, including nuclear experimentation.
Algeria is no longer limited to demanding apologies; it has begun implementing concrete measures to rehabilitate its territory.
Finally, military action now complements this political momentum. As early as 2021, two engineering units were created to begin securing former test sites. Since February 2026, a more ambitious intervention phase has been underway at Taourirt Tan Afella, where 13 underground explosions were conducted, four of which were not fully contained. Radiation measurements are currently being carried out, a base camp has been established, and a secure storage site has been set up for the first radioactive materials collected.
These political, diplomatic, and military actions form a coherent whole and demonstrate a long-term strategy. They represent both a symbolic and strategic turning point: Algeria is moving from a logic of protest to a logic of action, and it is doing so without waiting for the uncertain outcome of negotiations with France.
On the French side, while the executive remains silent, members of Parliament are attempting to move the issue forward. France adopted a law on Jan. 5, 2010, intended to compensate victims of nuclear explosions. However, it is widely acknowledged that this law has failed to meet its objectives.
In response to this failure, Member of Parliament Mereana Reid-Arbelot introduced a bill designed to ensure the effective implementation of the compensation regime. The bill was adopted on Jan. 29 by the National Assembly. It must now be examined and approved by the Senate to come into force. While its primary aim is to better define who qualifies as a victim, the bill also contains a specific provision concerning Algeria. Article 6 provides for the disclosure of archives relating to French nuclear explosions throughout the entire testing period. While archives concerning French Polynesia have largely been opened, those relating to the period 1960–1966 in Algeria remain classified. The bill also requires the government to submit a report to Parliament providing an overview of existing knowledge. These measures are essential for breaking with a culture of secrecy and advancing toward nuclear justice based on transparency.
The current dynamic opens up a double perspective. Algeria is a signatory to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) but has not yet ratified it. If it does so, it could strengthen its international legitimacy and gain political and technical support for environmental remediation. The Saharan desert would then no longer be merely the site of a catastrophe inherited from the past, but also a space for political and technical recovery in the service of nuclear justice. At the same time, France, as a recognized nuclear-weapon state, cannot build the future of its nuclear deterrence in Europe without confronting its own history. Strategic credibility cannot exist without nuclear justice. It is time for Paris to stop running from its past.
