Brookings scholars have collectively assessed the Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) and conclude that it represents a marked departure from recent US strategic orthodoxy, reorienting priorities toward the Western Hemisphere and economic instruments while downplaying the centrality of great‑power military competition. The new NSS, according to the report, “does not expressly reference major power competition once.”
Contributors — including Scott R. Anderson, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Pavel K. Baev, Vanda Felbab‑Brown, Mara Karlin, Patricia M. Kim, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and others — each parse different regional and thematic implications, producing a mosaic of critique and cautious endorsement.
The commentators argue that the NSS de‑emphasizes major‑power competition, notably by omitting explicit framing of China and Russia as primary strategic rivals; instead, the document privileges hemispheric concerns such as migration, trade, and economic rebalancing. “Mass migration is deemed to be the major external threat to the United States,” the report notes.
The analysts observe that this rhetorical shift signals a willingness to tolerate regional balances of power and to “rebalance” economic ties rather than pursue sustained ideological or military containment strategies, a change that many saw as potentially inviting strategic risk in Europe and the Indo‑Pacific.
Several authors focused on Europe and Russia. Pavel K. Baev and Steven Pifer warn that the NSS’s treatment of Europe and Russia effectively reduces the perceived threat from Moscow and risks signaling ambivalence about NATO commitments, a posture that Moscow could exploit to press nuclear and strategic advantages. Commentators also note that the strategy’s language on Europe — framing European political trajectories as a problem to be cultivated against — have the potential to deepen transatlantic rifts and to embolden populist, illiberal forces across the continent.
On the Western Hemisphere, Vanda Felbab‑Brown and others described the NSS as advancing a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, elevating migration, drugs, and China’s regional influence as primary threats and endorsing a more interventionist posture against criminal networks and foreign economic footholds. Felbab-Brown argues that the “Trump Corollary” could turn US into a “neo-imperialist presence in the region.”
“Notably, China is never named directly in the discussion of the Western Hemisphere, but there is little doubt that Beijing is the intended target when the document refers to ‘non-Hemispheric competitors’ to be pushed out of the region,” the report says. “How this demand will be balanced against the stated priority of trade negotiations remains an open question.”
Critics argue this approach risked perpetuating long‑standing resentments in Latin America and could produce open‑ended security commitments.
In Asia, Patricia M. Kim and Lynn Kuok find continuity in specific policy lines — support for Taiwan’s status quo, freedom of navigation, and regional partnerships — yet they emphasize that these positions are embedded within a far narrower global vision that deprioritizes the Indo‑Pacific relative to the Western Hemisphere. Analysts warn that sidelining the rules‑based international order and international law could undermine US leverage and complicate alliance diplomacy in Asia.
Economic and resilience themes have drawn mixed reactions. Kari Heerman and Michael O’Hanlon praised the NSS’s emphasis on economic vitality and technological strength as foundations of deterrence, while cautioning that heavy‑handed economic tools (notably tariffs) could erode long‑term leverage and alienate partners. Stephanie K. Pell highlights cyber and communications resilience as central to the strategy’s infrastructure priorities, noting the administration’s preference for industry partnerships and deregulation.
Across the essays, Brookings experts repeatedly stress that the NSS functions more as an ideological statement than an operational blueprint: It reflects internal political priorities, lacks budgetary alignment, and offers limited guidance for implementation. Several contributors conclude that the document has clarified the administration’s worldview — America First, transactional alliances, and hemispheric focus — even as it raises profound questions about alliance cohesion, international law, and the future shape of US global leadership.
