“Adults in a Room” is a series in collaboration with The Stimson Center’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy program. The series stems from the group’s monthly networking events that call on analysts to gather virtually and hash out a salient topic. It aims to give you a peek into their Zoom room and a deep understanding of the issue at hand in less than the time it takes to sip your morning coffee without the jargon, acronyms, and stuffiness that often come with expertise.
As climate change accelerates, its impacts are becoming increasingly widespread, including in the realm of global politics. Meanwhile, green technology has emerged as a critical component of the energy transition but also an issue in US-China competition — a fact that could slow down urgent efforts to combat climate change, especially in the Global South.
November’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy roundtable brought together members of the foreign policy community to discuss the geopolitical implications of the green transition. The conversation centered on the US approach to Chinese green technologies and how climate change may affect the distribution of power in global politics. The group discussed and debated topics including the possibility of a US-China grand bargain on green tech tariffs, climate mitigation and adaptation strategies, and the prospects for climate action under Donald Trump’s incoming administration.
Owen J. Daniels, Associate Director of Analysis and Andrew W. Marshall Fellow, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University
There is a growing reality that proponents of the green energy transition must confront: it’s a “dual-use” world out there when it comes to geopolitical competition, and we’re all living in it. Concrete challenges like climate change that require immediate attention today are jockeying for consideration alongside conflicts that may (or may not) come to pass. Today’s technologies’ roles in future wars are driving export controls and affecting other issues on the geopolitical spectrum ranging from cooperation to competition, the energy transition included.
Economic competition is an obvious motivator for trade tensions between the United States and China when it comes to Beijing’s production of green technologies, but it is not the only one. Considerations for future military advantages and the specter of conflict, most obviously over Taiwan, are shaping today’s cooperation and competition around real-world challenges. Recent Chinese efforts to restrict US access to critical minerals necessary for batteries, electric vehicles, and other clean technologies appear to be partially retaliatory for US semiconductor export controls. They may also uncover chokepoints in US military supply chains. While all militaries would need to contend with decreased reliance on fossil fuels as part of an energy transition, lending those with unfettered access to alternative energy sources natural advantages over competitors, China also appears interested in creating headaches for the US military separate from climate transition considerations. For instance, the latest round of Chinese export controls may affect the ability of US drone manufacturers like Skydio, who have helped eliminate the Defense Department’s dependence on cheap Chinese drones, to access necessary batteries. While drones alone are not going to win future wars in the Pacific, as INDOPACOM’s commander recently pointed out, they would be a critical part of the US force mix in a conflict.
The US semiconductor controls that have frustrated Beijing are of a similarly subjunctive mood, largely focused on slowing China’s future military capability development in addition to trying to cement US global leadership. Rounds of export controls on chips under the Biden administration have focused on blocking China’s access to the leading-edge semiconductors critical to the current compute-intensive development approach AI firms have used to create large language models, and which may be key to developing future foundational models. The controls were ostensibly intended to prevent China from developing advanced military AI capabilities, but they focus mostly on capturing chips that are not necessary for current military AI systems, like those that incorporate computer vision, autonomous navigation, or other current capabilities. Again, the focus appears to be on slowing China’s progress today to gain advantages for tomorrow’s war.
These dual-use issues will not be easily resolved, and with this security overlay to economic competition, it is difficult to foresee much headway on breaking through geopolitical tensions. Confidence building measures and delicate diplomacy — the near-term prospects of which seem far from assured — may be key to any progress.
Nevada Joan Lee, Research Associate, Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program, Stimson Center
The transition to renewable energy could be beneficial for militaries, even as it presents some challenges. As it stands, our militaries are uniquely vulnerable with respect to energy security and supply. So much so, in fact, that the Department of Defense has been conducting “energy resilience readiness exercises,” in which bases cut power and test their backup energy supply. These tests are created to simulate scenarios that are becoming increasingly more frequent and destructive: power outages due to natural disasters. Almost all our bases are connected to power grids, and the vast majority rely solely on civilian infrastructure to power their day-to-day operations. When a hurricane, unprecedented winter storm, or power outage affects a portion of the US, likelier than not, it is affecting a military base as well, sometimes requiring operations to be moved thousands of miles away. Power outages will be even more detrimental as we use more energy-intensive weapons, like directed energy weapons, drones, and electronic warfare systems.
When a hurricane, unprecedented winter storm, or power outage affects a portion of the US, likelier than not, it is affecting a military base as well.
Bases generally have backup power generation in case of emergencies, like large-scale natural disasters. Most of the time, these backup solutions are diesel generators. The issue with diesel generators is that they, too, are vulnerable and lack redundancy — largely because the backup to a diesel generator is a diesel generator. Right now, we do not have the technology to store large amounts of electricity effectively, making diesel generators the most reliable option. The Department of Defense has begun working on installing renewable energy resources on bases, which provides a couple benefits. For one, the more options bases have for energy production — whether that be through the civilian grid or autonomous production — the more resilient that base is. While many renewable resources are volatile, creating microgrids with renewable power generation can help off-set some of the vulnerabilities our military currently faces as it is almost entirely reliant on fossil fuels. In the process of enhancing energy resilience, the Department of Defense can also help mitigate carbon emissions, which, in turn, could help lessen the effects of climate-driven natural disasters which, as discussed, harm our operations.
Moreover, in any near-peer competition, fuel supplies cannot be guaranteed, especially in theater. For example, in a China contingency, fossil-fuel logistics and transportation would be a huge liability. In previous conflicts, fuel convoys proved risky — in the Iraq war, there was about one casualty for every 24 fuel convoys. Fuel convoys in future conflicts, should the Department of Defense continue to rely on fossil fuels, will unnecessarily put troops in harm’s way. Over 30% of global petroleum shipments traveled through the East China sea in 2023, mainly to supply China, South Korea, and Japan. In any conflict in the Indo-Pacific, our bases in Japan would be critical, but without a consistent fuel supply to those bases, conducting necessary military operations would be near impossible. Naval or airborne operations to refuel bases would be clear targets for adversarial attacks. Thus, the recent efforts to create solar micro-grids on military bases should be applauded and implemented on our overseas bases, where feasible. The Department of Defense’s efforts to mitigate climate change, in other words, might help not only create bases more resilient to natural disasters, but operations that are less reliant on fossil fuels and, therefore, less vulnerable.
Paul Pillar, Non-resident Senior Fellow, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University
The transition to a warmer world and measures to mitigate that warming will have significant effects on the global distribution of power, most of which will be long-term and measurable in decades. In the short term, however, the world faces a backward jolt to mitigation efforts as Donald Trump is about to take over the presidency of the second-biggest emitter of greenhouse gas. Likely climate-related moves by the incoming administration range from a second US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement to a rollback of environmental protections within the United States.
Some speculation envisions a Trump administration less hostile than this to climate-friendly policies, citing possible influence of his billionaire backer Elon Musk, with his stake in electric vehicles. But any such influence may be more to benefit Musk’s own company rather than electric vehicles in general. Besides, Musk needs Trump more than Trump needs Musk. Trump’s first inclination on climate policy, as it has been on almost any other policy, will be to do the opposite of whatever his Democratic predecessor did.
A geopolitical effect of the probable retrograde nature of US climate policy during the next four years will be to reduce US power and influence, in both the short and long term.
The policy will increasingly isolate the US from an international consensus on the need to mitigate climate change. The US will not be a player, or at least an effective player, in some international fora that address not only climate policy but also economic and other issues that are inseparable from climate issues.
Washington may also be the target of resentment, especially among less developed countries, for climate policies whose ill effects know no international boundaries.
Washington may also be the target of resentment, especially among less developed countries, for climate policies whose ill effects know no international boundaries. Unfavorable contrasts will be drawn with China, and the US will lose some of its soft power.
The US also will fall behind a global economic evolution away from fossil fuels. To the extent this pattern prevails, it will tend to hold back overall US economic strength and the international influence that goes with it.
None of these effects are irreversible, given future political and policy change in Washington. But time will have been lost in building America’s part of a green economy. The whipsawing of US climate policy with changes in administration also tends to make the US a less reliable and thus less attractive partner in international agreements.
Thomas Ramge, Fellow, Einstein Center Digital Future
Solar geoengineering is a bad idea and its time might come sooner than we think. I am glad that I was allowed to make that point in our Stimson online discussion on Oct. 21.
To avoid any misunderstandings from the get-go: In my upcoming book, Dimming the Sun, I am not arguing to start geoengineering the atmosphere as soon as possible, and within my years of research, I have not come across a reasonable scientist in the field who does. Yet, like many of these scientists, I am troubled by the lack of open consideration on the topic. Given the facts we know today, and considering the trends we see, I am convinced that solar geoengineering bears great potential to save the world from the worst effects of climate change. Conversely, it is crystal clear that human intervention as profound as technologically cooling down the planet bears great risks. I am worried about these risks as well, but what worries me much more is that humanity is not examining them as carefully as possible, as soon as possible — and that we might one day dim the sun recklessly.
It is no longer a question of whether solar geoengineering will be carried out, but only when, whether planned and in cooperation with critical geopolitical actors or by rogue agents. Dimming the sun is cheap. You might even say it’s too cheap. Maintaining the Earth’s temperature at current levels using sulfur aerosols is expected to cost less than $20 billion annually. This would save hundreds of billions in climate change costs in the short term and probably trillions in the medium term.
Rich states or an alliance of smaller countries from the Global South that suffer particularly severely from climate change would be able to dim the sun. A tech-fanatic tycoon with the personality of Elon Musk might feel called upon to turn down the Earth’s thermostat. A radical non-profit organization with a wide-reaching enthusiastic audience could also announce that the suffering caused by climate impacts is too great — and then take independent action.
Solar radiation modification may not be a perfect solution, but it is better than none at all. And there will be a country that would permit balloons or airplanes to take off. Global geoengineering chaos is conceivable: different actors sowing clouds and dimming the sun, uncoordinated and using various methods on several continents. We already live in a world with around 1.5°C (2.7°F) warming above pre-industrial average temperatures, the average from 1850 to 1900. But how attractive will dimming the sun be when the Paris Agreement’s upper limit of “well below 2°C (3.6°F)” is ancient history and the Earth system is heading toward a warming of 3°C (5.4°F)?
In the coming decade, the demand for solar geoengineering will be part of the political mainstream in many countries around the world. Sooner or later, a government, a coalition of states, or a nonstate actor will rush forward and cloud the stratosphere. Therefore, it is high time for science and the public, politics, and international climate bodies to systematically clarify the three central questions of solar geoengineering:
1. What technical approaches could be used to effectively and safely dim the sun?
2. What risks would solar geoengineering pose, and what side effects would it entail? Particularly important in this context are the geophysical uncertainties and, above all, the political and social concerns.
3. How could the (vast majority of) humanity agree on an effective decision-making mechanism for or against its deployment, and what legal framework would we need for this?
My book provides initial answers to these questions. And the bottom line is: Solar geoengineering can serve as stopgap solutions to buy humanity time for decarbonization. Again. Dimming the sun is a bad idea. But in one or two decades it might be the best idea we have left. We should prepare for this plausible, if not likely, scenario — scientifically, politically, and legally.
