“Adults in a Room” is a series in collaboration with The Stimson Center’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy program. The series stems from the group’s monthly networking events that call on analysts to gather virtually and hash out a salient topic. It aims to give you a peek into their Zoom room and a deep understanding of the issue at hand in less than the time it takes to sip your morning coffee without the jargon, acronyms, and stuffiness that often come with expertise.
The United States recently ended a 30-day military campaign against the Houthi armed group in Yemen with a ceasefire. The campaign has drawn criticism and sparked controversy in the form of the Signalgate scandal, but US President Donald Trump has championed it as a success.
April’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy roundtable brought members of the foreign policy community together to discuss the US campaign against the Houthis, which was ongoing at the time. Two speakers opened by discussing the goals, challenges, and risks of the campaign, as well as related war powers and legal concerns. The group then discussed and debated how the United States should approach the Houthis’ attacks on Red Sea shipping, the tradeoffs and costs of military action against the group, and the campaign’s implications for US policy in the Middle East and beyond.
Will A. Smith, Research Associate, Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program, Stimson Center
President Trump’s May 6 announcement of a ceasefire with the Houthis was a welcome surprise. The deal halts “Operation Rough Rider,” the US air campaign in Yemen, in return for an end to Houthi attacks on US Naval and commercial vessels. Trump quickly declared victory, even though the ceasefire essentially only brought a return to the pre-campaign status quo between the United States and the Houthis. Still, he was right to do so. The US needed a way out of a campaign with no clear endgame and mounting risks. The deal offered one. Now, the challenge is resisting pressure to resume strikes against the Houthis.
While the “Signalgate” scandal dominated headlines, more serious concerns about the operation were overlooked. For starters, the economic case for such significant military action never added up. The economic impact of re-routing ships to avoid Houthi attacks has been minimal, particularly for the US, and shippers are unlikely to return to the Red Sea as long as the Gaza war continues, irrespective of Houthi attacks.
US airstrikes undoubtedly degraded the Houthis, but their weapons are dispersed, protected, and easily replaced. This makes it nearly impossible to “completely annihilate” them, as Trump vowed to do. Indeed, a US official noted after the ceasefire announcement that the Houthis “still have significant capabilities,” underscored by their recent ballistic missile attack on Israel’s main airport.
The campaign was quickly becoming an unsustainable, open-ended mission, drawing scarce resources and attention away from more urgent priorities. The US spent well over $1 billion in just two months, with two carrier groups and in-demand air defense systems retasked to support operations. Stockpiles of precision munitions were rapidly depleted, further straining the US defense industrial base and prompting alarm at Indo-Pacific Command.
The campaign was quickly becoming an unsustainable, open-ended mission, drawing scarce resources and attention away from more urgent priorities.
More significant than the material costs, though, were the escalation risks — both with the Houthis and Iran. With the campaign continuing to struggle, the Trump administration was soon going to have to choose between calling it quits and escalating further. US officials were considering expanding the campaign to support a ground offensive by anti-Houthi Yemeni forces. Pressure to escalate would have only become more intense if US service members died in a Houthi attack — the likelihood of which grew every day the campaign continued.
The US effort against the Houthis was also raising the risk of direct conflict with Iran and, as some US officials came to recognize, undermining nuclear talks at a fragile moment. As the campaign dragged on and the Houthis continued to launch attacks, calls mounted to go after Iran, the group’s main patron. Just days before the ceasefire, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth threatened military action against Iran.
Fortunately, Washington opted to take the offramp, putting an end to a misguided and risky mission. The Trump administration deserves credit for walking away from an operation that wasn’t going anywhere rather than falling victim to the sunk cost thinking that has so often kept the US embroiled in conflicts. But the administration is not out of the woods yet.
Those escalation pressures haven’t disappeared. The Houthis still possess a sizable arsenal of drones and missiles. The group is continuing to attack Israel, and it could very well resume attacks on Red Sea shipping in light of Israel’s looming escalation in Gaza. Shipping companies remain hesitant to return to the Red Sea. Nevertheless, the Trump administration should stay the course in the face of inevitable calls to “finish the job” the next time a Houthi attack makes headlines. There are promising signs that Washington will not succumb to pressure to re-engage as attacks on Israel continue, with even US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee noting that the United States and Israel have distinct interests.
Halting strikes in Yemen has created space to push for an end to the Gaza war, which is at the root of the Houthis’ aggression. The Houthis have consistently linked their campaign to Israel’s war in Gaza and suspended attacks during the January ceasefire. Thus, a ceasefire in Gaza — already in US interests — may be the most likely path to a lasting end to Houthi attacks.
Ferial Ara Saeed, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Stimson Center, and Former US Diplomat
On May 6, President Trump suspended the US bombing campaign in Yemen after Houthi forces agreed to halt attacks on American ships in the Red Sea. According to The New York Times, Oman proposed and brokered the ceasefire after Trump grew frustrated with 30 days of inconclusive airstrikes. Media reports citing Iranian officials suggest that Iran leaned on the Houthis, fearing escalation in the Red Sea could derail nuclear talks with the US.
The timeline — and the administration’s quick acceptance of Oman’s offramp — further suggests that the campaign was never just about freedom of navigation. It was also about creating leverage over Tehran.
From the outset, experts, including one serving in the administration, doubted that bombing Yemen would restore maritime security. The Houthis are resilient and undeterred by airstrikes, as Saudi Arabia learned after nearly a decade of war in Yemen. Trump had also sharply criticized President Biden for “dropping bombs all over Yemen” instead of pursuing diplomacy. Yet in March, Trump launched his own escalation, with no clearer endgame.
The economic rationale was weak. Rerouted shipping didn’t cause the inflation many feared, and freight rates have since fallen. Tellingly, Vice President JD Vance noted in the Signalgate revelations that the Suez Canal isn’t even critical to US trade. The strikes were also extremely costly: $2 million American missiles were used to take out $2000 Houthi drones. More importantly, for a United States seeking to focus on Asia and great power rivalry with China, a deeper role in Yemen made little strategic sense.
Despite the stated goals of the campaign, the timeline of events tells a different story of what motivated it. US strikes began March 15, days after Iran’s Supreme Leader rejected Trump’s offer of nuclear talks, per the BBC. Trump warned Tehran via Truth Social that Iran would “pay the price” if the Houthi attacks continued, while US officials blamed Tehran for the Red Sea campaign, signaling US willingness to escalate beyond Yemen.
Two weeks later, on March 27, Iran agreed to nuclear talks. The first round began April 12; two more followed. A fourth was postponed for negotiations over the Houthi ceasefire involving Iran, per diplomatic sources. Oman, which is mediating the nuclear talks, also mediated the Houthi talks. Though hard to prove causation, at a minimum, the US saw its Houthi campaign and pursuit of an Iran nuclear deal as linked, and the sequence of events suggests the strikes helped push diplomacy with the Houthis, and Iran, forward.
Critics may argue that this approach was risky and transactional. It’s true that escalation could’ve backfired, and civilian casualties in Yemen deserve attention. Still, the administration pivoted quickly to diplomacy.
It’s true that escalation could’ve backfired, and civilian casualties in Yemen deserve attention.
That is not surprising. The Houthi ceasefire and potential Iran deal resonate domestically: a majority of Americans — including Trump’s base — oppose a new military entanglement in the Middle East. Trump and Vance campaigned on avoiding new wars and ending existing ones. Vance was explicit that war with Iran is not in the US interest, calling it “a huge distraction of resources” and “massively expensive,” instead advocating “smart diplomacy” to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Ending the Yemen campaign with a ceasefire, rather than further escalation, fulfills a key campaign promise.
On top of that, with the Saudis rejecting the Abraham Accords and Trump’s Middle East legacy in question, securing a ratified Iran nuclear deal, something that eluded President Obama, would give Trump a legacy-defining win. It would also establish a stronger basis for addressing other issues like Iran’s missile program.
Now comes the harder part: converting this diplomatic momentum into a credible deal with Iran. There are no guarantees, but in a region where military action often spirals into quagmire, this could be an exception: a case where limited force opened the door to diplomacy rather than closing it.
Rosemary A. Kelanic, Director, Middle East Program, Defense Priorities
The US military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen was unnecessary and unlikely to succeed in halting attacks on Red Sea shipping. Early reporting on President Trump’s decision to abruptly halt the campaign suggests he reached the same conclusion. Thirty days into the airstrikes, the US still hadn’t established air superiority over the group, and when asked to report on results, it’s telling that the best success metric CENTCOM could offer was data on how many munitions were dropped. Instead of pursuing a military strategy of dubious value, the Trump administration should push harder for a ceasefire in Gaza, which would settle the Houthis’ core grievance, further US interests, and make for good policy on its own merits.
Bombing the Houthis was misguided because their attacks on Red Sea shipping have caused little harm to the US or the global economy. Despite the hype, the Houthis are not why eggs cost $10 per dozen. The recent wave of high inflation started during the COVID pandemic in 2021 — two years before the Houthis targeted global shipping — and inflation has actually decreased since Houthi attacks began.
Yes, Houthi attacks have forced many Western companies to reroute shipping around the coast of southern Africa, which increases shipping costs. But that increase is negligible — about $1 million on a container ship carrying roughly $300 million of cargo — a mere 0.3% cost increase spread across the value of the goods. So, it makes sense that there would be no correlation between Houthi operations and consumer prices.
Using military force is also a bad idea because it won’t work. Houthi missiles and drones are small, portable, and hidden across the Yemeni countryside, making them difficult to locate and destroy. Even if you could find them all, such weapons are cheap to replace, meaning the Houthis could easily rearm. Plus, the military approach is extremely cost-ineffective, with the US using $2 million missiles to defeat $2,000 drones. By some estimates, the US has spent $6 billion fighting the Houthis — including $1 billion during the first three weeks of Trump’s airstrikes alone — without significantly hampering their capabilities.
Nor is it likely that US strikes could impose enough pain on the group to dissuade further attacks. The Houthis are the “honey badgers” of the region — fearless, resilient, and highly resolved to fight. They endured years of punishment from Saudi airstrikes during the Yemeni civil war and not only survived but thrived, using the airstrikes’ brutality to grow their political support. For the Houthis, being attacked by the US is practically an honor — it raises them out of obscurity, therefore playing into their hands.
“Decapitation” strikes targeting Houthi leaders won’t work, either, because much like their weapons, Houthi leaders are tough to locate and easy to replace. The organization has recovered from decapitation attacks before. Its namesake leader, Hussein al-Houthi, was killed by Yemeni government forces back in 2004. Yet, over 20 years later, the group still stands.
Bombing the Houthis wasn’t just a pointless waste — it was dangerous. Anytime the US military is involved, there is a non-zero risk of taking casualties. It is tragic when US military personnel are killed in the line of duty, whatever the circumstances, but especially so if the operation carries no strategic benefit. Moreover, if the Houthis did manage to kill US service members, that would put significant pressure on Trump to escalate in retaliation, even if the baseline value of the conflict is low or even negative. The US would just get drawn deeper into a losing fight.
The fact that bombing the Houthis probably won’t compel them to stop also generates escalation dilemmas. The Trump administration would have faced the loathsome choice of either admitting failure or redoubling its efforts to pound the Houthis harder. Failure to defeat the Houthis has already induced the US to escalate twice: President Biden shifted to airstrikes in January 2024 when naval efforts in December 2023 failed to deter the Houthis, and President Trump intensified the bombing in March 2025 after declaring the Biden policy a failure. If the campaign continued without achieving its desired results, the temptation to escalate further and avoid backing down would have been strong.
So far, only one thing has stopped Houthi attacks: the temporary Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiated during the Trump transition in January 2025. Had hostilities not resumed — and had the Trump administration not launched a new round of airstrikes — the Red Sea might have stayed peaceful. Encouraging a new Gaza deal is Washington’s best chance for getting the Houthis to stand down. But if that chance is not taken, or the Houthi offensive nevertheless continues, the US should not again waste resources and risk escalation for no strategic gain.
Gregory Brew, Senior Analyst, Iran and Energy, Eurasia Group
The military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen was ostensibly designed to “reopen” the Red Sea. It was also meant to demonstrate US military power, with Iran as the intended audience, building a credible military threat in the event negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program end in failure.
In both regards, “Operation Rough Rider” was underwhelming — and likely counter-productive.
First, it’s inaccurate to say that the Red Sea is “closed” to commercial traffic. According to PortWatch, an open-source database operated by the International Monetary Fund , an average of 30 ships transit the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb strait every day. True, that’s less than half the volume of traffic before November 2023, when Ansarallah, or the Houthis, began their campaign against ships delivering goods to Israel, which they later expanded to include ships associated with the US and United Kingdom following a military escalation by the US and its allies to deter Houthi attacks. Though their attacks are somewhat indiscriminate, the Houthis avoid striking ships carrying Middle East energy — oil, gas, and refined products — or vessels affiliated with China. The group paused attacks during the ceasefire in Gaza in early 2025 and have repeatedly indicated they will end attacks if a permanent ceasefire is reached.
In the meantime, Western shipping companies have avoided the area, opting instead for the longer route around Africa. While diversions initially imposed costs on shipping companies, those costs have fallen as supply chains have adjusted to the new normal. The main expense, transportation fuel, has fallen as a factor in costs due to the declining price of oil. Onshore storage facilities used by ships to refuel (“bunkers”), which were neglected in early 2024, have since been filled, and there is now improved logistical support for ships transiting the longer African route.
Shipping companies are no doubt eager to cut costs and make use of the Red Sea route. But the high intensity of the combat operations there is likely to deter them from doing so. In that sense, fighting the Houthis is likely counterproductive — the quickest way to restore the original volume of shipping through the Red Sea would be to achieve a permanent peace in Gaza. Shippers will stay away so long as the missiles are flying.
Second, it’s unclear whether the campaign against the Houthis contributed to the US negotiating position with Iran, which hinges on maintaining a credible threat to destroy Iran’s nuclear program through military force if Iran does not make concessions. The US reportedly deployed advanced munitions in Yemen, including bunker-busting bombs dropped from B-2 stealth bombers, without meaningfully degrading Houthi capabilities. Even worse, it’s possible the strikes are failing to destroy Houthi facilities. Iran may draw the opposite takeaway: that Washington’s threats are toothless, and that strikes will not succeed in damaging the nuclear program or setting it back in any meaningful way. It would be prudent for the US to rethink its strategy, and to hone in on achievable goals in Yemen — goals linked to a stronger effort at achieving peace in Gaza and a diplomatic solution with Iran.
