A recent major audit of US alliances underscores how Washington’s partners in the Indo‑Pacific have adapted to the intensifying rivalry with Beijing. The report, “Legacy or Liability? Auditing US Alliances for Competition with China,” describes Japan as “the United States’ most important Indo‑Pacific ally” and Australia as “a capable partner across a range of issues,” each playing distinct roles in the contest with China.
The report opens with a blunt description of Japan as indispensable: “Japan is the United States’ most important Indo-Pacific ally, a core player in the semiconductors sector, a technological giant, the world’s fourth-largest economy whose military capabilities are expanding, host to critical US bases in the region, and a key partner to the Global South.”
Tokyo’s defense transformation, the way the report puts it, comes as a direct response to Beijing’s assertiveness. The report notes that Japan has “embarked on a major transformation of its security policy that involves increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP, investing in key capabilities such as in cyber, and developing a long-range counterstrike capability that will allow it to strike targets in China and North Korea.”
Nonetheless, public opinion reveals a potential fragility behind US-Japan ties. After US tariffs came into effect earlier in 2025, “77% of Japanese respondents did not believe the United States would come to Japan’s defense in a crisis.” This skepticism underscores the risk that economic disputes could erode trust even as military cooperation deepens.
Japan’s semiconductor dominance is another pillar, and the report details how Japanese firms produced “88% of coaters/developers, 57% of wafer-cleaning systems, 53% of silicon wafers, and potentially up to 90% of photoresists.” Such capabilities make Japan vital to US efforts to diversify supply chains away from China.
Still, Tokyo has balanced deterrence with diplomacy. Its 2022 National Security Strategy labeled China the “greatest strategic challenge,” but leaders continued to seek a “constructive and stable” relationship with Beijing. This dual track reflects both economic interdependence and strategic caution.
Meanwhile, Australia’s role is less resource‑rich than Japan’s but strategically significant. The report states: “The US-Australia alliance has received growing attention from experts as Australia’s once warm relations with China have run aground.”
Canberra’s importance largely stems from minerals and military basing. The report emphasizes that Australia “possesses large scale deposits across many of the critical minerals and rare earths essential for US strategic applications. It is the world’s largest miner of lithium and rutile titanium and the fourth-largest miner of rare earth elements for magnets.” This positions Australia as a linchpin in US efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese refining.
The 2021 launch of AUKUS marked a turning point, the report explains. Through the pact, “the United States will share advanced nuclear-propulsion and sonar technologies to co-develop nuclear-powered submarines.” By 2027, US and UK submarines are scheduled for rotational deployment from Perth, with Australia set to receive Virginia‑class submarines in the 2030s.
Australia’s bases, the authors write, are “unsinkable aircraft carriers” projecting US power into the Pacific. Tindal Air Base was upgraded for B‑52 bombers, while Pine Gap has continued to provide “high-value intelligence” as part of the Five Eyes network.
Public opinion, however, remains divided. A 2023 poll found “42% of respondents said they supported Australia getting militarily involved if China invaded Taiwan … while 56 percent said they were opposed.” This strategic ambiguity mirrors Washington’s own stance, leaving Canberra’s role in a Taiwan contingency uncertain.
Both allies have faced dilemmas of trust and entanglement. Japan’s doubts about US reliability and Australia’s declining public confidence in Washington reveal vulnerabilities. The report warns that tariffs and domestic politics could “slow the cooperative momentum that has built up around China in recent years.”
At the same time, both countries were indispensable in supply chain resilience. Japan’s semiconductor leadership and Australia’s mineral wealth remain critical to US friendshoring strategies. Together, they offer alternatives to China’s dominance in advanced technology and resource processing.
The audit concludes that alliances are America’s greatest advantage but not automatic. Japan and Australia illustrate both promise and peril: robust capabilities, deep integration, but fragile public trust and economic dependencies. As the report puts it, “Given the volatility of Sino-Japanese relations, Japan has strong incentives to diversify and secure its semiconductors and critical-minerals supply chains by collaborating with the United States,” while Australia “remains largely aligned with the United States on China and foreign policy in general” despite domestic doubts.
In the contest with China, the report makes clear, Washington’s future depends not only on its own strength but on the resilience of allies whose cooperation could tip the balance of power in the Indo‑Pacific.
