What impact do radical right parties have on local opinion? That was the question before Karl Loxbo in a new article, “How the radical right reshapes public opinion: the Sweden Democrats’ local mobilization, 2002–2020” published this month in the journal of West European Politics.
Previous research had already suggested that radical right parties reshaped Europe’s party politics by polarizing voters and prompting policy changes from more established parties, but, per Loxbo, there was relatively little on what impact they had on voters’ preferences and ideologies. This study intended to fill that research gap.
Loxbo focused on one country — Sweden — in order to “to analyze the interplay between voters’ attitudes (the demand side) and [radical right parties’] local mobilization (the supply side), the study bypasses static country-level measures in comparative research.”
Loxbo felt that the Sweden Democrats made for a “compelling” choice as they were stigmatized and “branded as a pariah,” had organizational and electoral success at the local level, and ended up with power as a support for the center-right. As Loxbo writes, “evidence reveals that [radical right party] strongholds in local politics serve as ‘stepping stones’ for broader influence.”
Migration in Focus
Loxbo’s study used local-level data from the country’s 290 municipalities and combined it with survey data to find that the gradual establishment of radical right parties does indeed change voters’ policy preferences — and increases the salience of the issue of immigration.
In fact, with the introduction and spread of radical right parties, individuals “increasingly sort their ideological views according to their positions on immigration, while reducing the prominence of economic redistribution issues,” which has the effect of “driving individuals with anti-immigration attitudes towards right-wing identifications, and those with pro-immigration towards left-wing identifications.”
Further, public attention shifts from issues around economics to concerns around immigration. Loxbo notes that economic concerns have remained more dominant in Sweden than in other countries, and thus concludes that these results suggest that radical right parties’ “local establishment generally has the potential to reshape European politics.”
However, Loxbo admits that the study has a “main limitation”: “By focusing on localized variations in the establishment of one [radical right party], the Sweden Democrats (SD), the study might overestimate the importance of [radical right parties’] build-up in local politics.”
Because many shunned the Sweden Democrats, the party had to come up by focusing on local elections. Perhaps this, or a charismatic leader or some combination of the two, could make local elections less important to the radical right parties of other countries.
Future research, Loxbo argues, should thus take a cross-national approach, and readers should see this study as just one —albeit significant — step in understanding the impact of radical right parties on voters’ preferences and ideologies.
